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10	UNITED STATES	DISTRICT COURT
11	NORTHERN DISTR	ICT OF CALIFORNIA
12	OAKLANI	D DIVISION
12	In re ALPHABET, INC. SECURITIES LITIGATION) Master File No. 4:18-cv-06245-JSW
13) <u>CLASS ACTION</u>
15	This Document Relates To:	 CONSOLIDATED AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR VIOLATION OF THE
15	ALL ACTIONS.) FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS
10	STATE OF RHODE ISLAND/OFFICE OF)
18	THE RHODE ISLAND TREASURER ON)
10	BEHALF OF THE EMPLOYEES' RETIREMENT SYSTEM OF RHODE)
20	ISLAND, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated,)
20	Plaintiff,)
21	vs.	/))
22	ALPHABET, INC., LAWRENCE E. PAGE,	/))
23 24	SUNDAR PICHAI, GOOGLE LLC, KEITH P. ENRIGHT, and JOHN KENT WALKER, JR.	/))
24 25	Defendants.))) DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
25 26		J DEMAND FOR JUNT INIAL
20 27		
27		
20		
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Lead Plaintiff State of Rhode Island, Office of the Rhode Island Treasurer on behalf of the
 Employees' Retirement System of Rhode Island ("Plaintiff"), on behalf of itself and the Class (as
 defined below) it seeks to represent, alleges the following upon knowledge as to its own acts and
 upon the investigation conducted by its counsel, which included, among other things, a review of:
 U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") filings by Alphabet; securities analysts' reports
 about Alphabet; press releases and other public statements issued by the Companies (as defined
 herein) and media reports about the Companies.

8

INTRODUCTION

9 1. This securities class action is brought on behalf of those who purchased or otherwise
acquired securities of Alphabet, Inc. ("Alphabet") between April 23, 2018 and October 7, 2018,
inclusive (the "Class Period"), seeking to pursue remedies under §§10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 ("Exchange Act") and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder.

13 2. This case arises out of defendants' misleading statements relating to data security and management integrity. Specifically, defendants learned of a three-year-long software glitch in the 14 15 Google+ social media network that potentially exposed the private personal data of millions of Google+ users to third-parties, and led to the discovery of other systemic vulnerabilities that further 16 17 compromised the data security of Google+ users. Defendants knew of these data-security issues in 18 March of 2018, but for months, they continued to stress to investors the importance of data security 19 and simply warned investors about *risks* related to data-security issues and concerns, while 20 concealing that these risks had already been realized and that defendants had such poor security 21 controls and record keeping that they could not determine the scope of the data breach, identify all of 22 the affected users, detect other data-security bugs, or protect the private personal data of the tens of 23 millions of Google+ users. The Wall Street Journal ("WSJ") led the exposure of defendants' 24 scheme, triggering governmental investigations, Congressional hearings, the shutdown of the 25 Google+ social media network, undermined confidence in the integrity of defendants' data security 26 and management, and damaged investors.

- 27
- 28

JURISDICTION AND VENUE 1 2 3. The claims asserted herein arise under and pursuant to \$10(b) and 20(a) of the 3 Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. §§78j(b) and 78t(a), and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC"), 17 C.F.R. §240.10b-5. 4 5 4. This Court has jurisdiction over the action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1331 and §27 of the Exchange Act. 6 7 5. Venue is proper in this Judicial District pursuant to §27 of the Exchange Act, 15 8 U.S.C. §78aa, and 28 U.S.C. §1391(b) as Alphabet and Google LLC are headquartered in this 9 Judicial District. 6. 10 In connection with the acts and conduct alleged in this Complaint, defendants, directly or indirectly, used the means and instrumentalities of interstate commerce, including, but not 11 12 limited to, the United States mail, interstate wire and telephone communications, and the facilities of 13 a national securities exchange. 14 THE PARTIES 7. 15 Plaintiff, as set forth in the certification previously submitted and incorporated herein 16 by reference, acquired Alphabet securities at an artificially inflated price during the Class Period and 17 was damaged as a result of defendants' alleged misconduct. See ECF No. 19-3. 18 8. Defendant Alphabet is a multinational conglomerate headquartered in Mountain 19 View, California. Its ordinary shares trade on the NASDAQ Global Select Market ("NASDAQ") 20 under the ticker symbol "GOOG." As of January 31, 2019, there were 349,291,348 ordinary shares 21 of Alphabet stock outstanding. 9. 22 Defendant Google LLC is a technology company that specializes in Internet-related 23 services and products, which include online advertising technologies, search engine, cloud 24 computing, software, and hardware. Alphabet was created after a corporate restructuring of Google, 25 Inc. on October 2, 2015, where Alphabet became the parent company of Google, Inc. and several 26 other Google, Inc. subsidiaries. As part of the Alphabet reorganization, Google, Inc. was converted 27 28 1553457_1 CONSOLIDATED AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR VIOLATION OF THE FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS- 4:18-cv-06245-JSW - 2 into a limited liability company in September 2017.¹ Google is a wholly owned subsidiary of
 Alphabet.

3 10. Defendant Keith P. Enright ("Enright") was Google's Legal Director of Privacy from
4 2016 until September 2018, when he became Google's Chief Privacy Officer. In addition, since
5 May 2018, Enright has been Google's "data protection officer" ("DPO") for the purpose of
6 compliance with the European Union's General Data Protection Regulation ("GDPR").

11. Defendant Lawrence E. Page ("Page") is the co-founder of Google. In 2001, Page
stepped aside as Google's CEO, only to resume the role in 2011. Just four years later, Page became
the CEO of Alphabet. Throughout the Class Period, Page sat on Alphabet's Board of Directors, and
was a member of the Board's three-person Executive Committee.

12. Defendant Sundar Pichai ("Pichai") has served as Chief Executive Officer ("CEO") 11 12 of Google since 2015. Pichai's involvement with Google began in 2004, when he joined as the head 13 of product management and development. In 2008, after working on Google's own browser, Chrome, Pichai was named Vice President of Product Development, and in 2012, he was named 14 15 Senior Vice President. Thereafter, in 2014, Pichai was made product chief over both Google and the Android smartphone operating system. Throughout the Class Period, Pichai sat on Alphabet's Board 16 of Directors, and beginning in April 2018 became a member of the Board's three-person Executive 17 18 Committee.

Defendant John Kent Walker, Jr. ("Walker") was Google's Vice President and
 General Counsel from 2006 until August 2018, when he became Google's Senior Vice President for
 Global Affairs. As General Counsel, Walker was responsible for managing Google's global legal
 team and advising the company's Board of Directors and management on legal issues and corporate
 governance matters.

- 24 14. The defendants referenced above in ¶10-13 are also referred to herein as the
 25 "Individual Defendants."
- 26

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 ²⁷ Google, Inc. and Google LLC are collectively referred to herein as "Google." Google and Alphabet are collectively referred to as "the Companies."

15. 1 During the Class Period, the Individual Defendants, as senior executive officers 2 and/or directors of Alphabet and/or Google, were privy to confidential and proprietary, non-public 3 information concerning the Companies' operations and possessed the power and authority to control 4 the contents of the Companies' public statements, including quarterly and annual reports, press 5 releases, Congressional testimony, and presentations to securities analysts, money and portfolio managers, and institutional investors. They either made or received the Companies' statements 6 7 alleged herein to be misleading prior to or shortly after their issuance and had the ability and 8 opportunity to prevent their issuance or cause them to be corrected. Because of their positions with 9 the Companies, personal participation in the fraud as detailed herein, communications with other 10 corporate officers and employees, including their attendance at management and Board of Directors 11 meetings, and their access to material non-public information available to them but not to the public, 12 the Individual Defendants knew or disregarded with severe recklessness that the adverse facts 13 specified herein had not been disclosed to, and were being concealed from, the investing public.

14 16. The Individual Defendants are liable as direct participants in the wrongs complained
15 of herein. In addition, Page and Pichai, by reason of their status as senior executive officers and/or
16 directors, were "controlling persons" within the meaning of §20(a) of the Exchange Act, and had the
17 power and influence to cause the Companies to engage in the unlawful conduct complained of
18 herein. Because of their positions of control, Page and Pichai were able to, and did, directly or
19 indirectly control the conduct of the Companies' business.

20 17. As senior executive officers and/or directors of a publicly traded company whose 21 stock was, and is, registered with the NASDAQ and governed by the federal securities laws, the 22 Individual Defendants had a duty to promptly disseminate accurate and truthful information with 23 respect to the Companies' security measures, data protections, operations, business, products, 24 management, and earnings, and to correct any previously issued statements that had been materially 25 misleading or untrue, so that the market price of Alphabet securities would be based upon truthful 26 and accurate information. The Individual Defendants' omissions during the Class Period violated 27 these requirements and obligations.

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SUBSTANTIVE ALLEGATIONS

The Companies' Professed Commitment to "Do[ing] the Right Thing" 2 3

1


3	18. Alphabet is essentially a holding company. Its lifeblood is Google, and Google's
4	lifeblood is technology and trust. In just two decades, Google has grown to one of the world's most
5	valuable companies based on technology that: (1) allows it to track and collect an unprecedented
6 7	amount of personal information about people; and (2) enables it to use that information to help
8	companies sell stuff to those people. No matter what anyone does anywhere, Google is watching, or
o 9	trying to watch. Without tremendous trust in Google's technology and management, consumers and
10	investors would condemn what Google does as not just an invasion of privacy, but the destruction of
10	privacy.
12	19. Google's founders, Sergey Brin and defendant Page, were acutely aware of the fine
12	line between innovative assistance and insidious invasiveness. Google's technology is inextricably
14	intertwined with its trustworthiness because without extensive consumer buy-in and participation,
15	Google would be worthless because it would not have a critical mass of personal data to mine and
16	exploit. This is why Google has always gone to great lengths to portray itself as uncommonly
17	trustworthy. The prospectus for its initial public offering memorialized this portrayal:
18	DON'T BE EVIL
19	Don't be evil. We believe strongly that in the long term, we will be better served – as shareholders and in all other ways – by a company that does good things for the world even if we forgo some short term gains. This is an important
20	aspect of our culture and is broadly shared within the company. (Emphasis in original.)
21	* * *
22	MAKING THE WORLD A BETTER PLACE
23	We aspire to make Google an institution that makes the world a better
24	place We know that some people have raised privacy concerns, primarily over Gmail's targeted ads, which could lead to negative perceptions about Google.
25	However, we believe Gmail protects a user's privacy. By releasing services, such as Gmail, for free, we hope to help bridge the digital divide. AdWords connects users
26	and advertisers efficiently, helping both
27	SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
28	
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Google is not a conventional company. Eric, Sergey and I intend to operate Google differently, applying the values it has developed as a private company to its future as a public company. Our mission and business description are available in the rest of this prospectus; we encourage you to carefully read this information. We will optimize for the long term rather than trying to produce smooth earnings for each quarter.... We are conscious of our duty as fiduciaries for our shareholders, and we will fulfill those responsibilities. . . . We will live up to our "don't be evil" principle by keeping user trust and not accepting payment for search results.

We have a strong commitment to our users worldwide, their communities, the web sites in our network, our advertisers, our investors, and of course our employees. Sergey and I, and the team will do our best to make Google a long term success and the world a better place.

9 20. In October 2013, Google's then-Executive Chairman, Eric Schmidt ("Schmidt"), 10 made clear that if Google were to have a significant data breach "it would be devastating." Schmidt emphasized that regardless of the succession plan at Google, when it comes to data breaches, 11 12 "[w]e're always one mistake away. It's inconceivable you could materially change that." Schmidt 13 reassured conference attendees that Google's focus on data privacy would remain constant because then-CEO Page "is so precisely wired on these issues, it is inconceivable that there would ever be a 14 change" and Google's culture was so strongly fixed on data security that it would remain the focus 15 16 of the company for the foreseeable future.



19 22. Following the creation of Alphabet, the Companies continued to tout their leadership 20 in data-use transparency and security, not only as a central pillar of the Companies' culture, but also 21 as a competitive advantage for Google and Alphabet to succeed in new products and new markets. 22 For example, at the November 17, 2016 Phocuswright Conference for travel industry 23. 23 leaders, Oliver Heckmann ("Heckmann"), Google's Vice President of Travel, assured investors that 24 Google was uniquely well-positioned in the travel sector precisely because of its ability to leverage 25 its strategy of data movement across its various services while keeping the trust of its customers by "giving the user full control and ownership of [her or his] data." Heckmann stated that maintaining 26 27 users' trust is essential to making users "more willing to have that data . . . used" across platforms, 28 for example when allowing Google to analyze an air travel receipt from its user's Google Mail CONSOLIDATED AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR VIOLATION OF THE FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS-4:18-cv-06245-JSW

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1 (Gmail) account inbox and automatically importing those flight details into the user's Google 2 Calendar account: 3 Elizabeth Harz - Adara - President, Media & CMO 4 So, as a consumer, I certainly see how my United flight data goes from Google Mail to my calendar and I would just love to get Google's perspective on 5 data strategy – the collection, ownership, privacy. Many of those questions come up when you experience that kind of data movement. 6 **Oliver Heckmann – Google Inc – VP, Travel** 7 Yes, privacy is actually a topic that's important for us and as you know or 8 might not know, there is something that's called the Google Dashboard that is creating transparency over the data that we have and the different services that 9 Google has to the user, and it's using pretty clear language and it's giving the user full control and ownership of the data. And we feel that that's an important thing to 10 do and as the user is in control and ownership of the data, he is more willing to have that data be used for us to create some delightful experiences. If the user is not opting out of those services, what we can do is we can, from the email receipt in 11 his inbox, for example, that's a new version of Gmail, we can show you your travel 12 information more structured so you don't have to – you are landing in Paris; you are on roaming; you need to find your hotel and then the faster we can actually get you 13 to that information, the more delightful and the less stressful your travel experience is going to be. 14 24. At the February 14, 2017 Goldman Sachs Technology Conference, Diane Greene 15 ("Greene"), Board Member of Alphabet and Senior Vice President of Google Cloud, touted 16 Google's superior data security as enhancing its prospects in the cloud computing and financial-17 technology ("FinTech") industries: 18 Security, Google's had security pretty much from day one because of the 19 necessity to keep people's data private. I think we arguably have the most secure cloud on the planet, but we've also really hunkered down over the last 16 months 20 to get all the compliance and regulatory so our large customers can prove to their customers and to their regulators that they are indeed secure. I mean security matters from the board on down to the individual user, IT worker at a company, 21 it's so important and if you look at things like G Suite, our productivity suite built in 22 the cloud completely in the secure cloud and you map that to the diskless Chromebook, you actually can run a workforce with an amazing level of security. 23 Google, when I say it's a privilege to be at Google, Google organizing the 24 world's information, we've been inventing how to manage data for 16 years now, how to really quickly go through massive amounts of data. 25 26 **Unidentified Audience Member** 27 Could you talk a little more in detail about why FinTech has you so excited? 28 1553457_1 CONSOLIDATED AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR VIOLATION OF THE FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS- 4:18-cv-06245-JSW - 7

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1	Diane Greene - Alphabet Inc - SVP, Google Cloud		
2 3 4 5	Oh, why does FinTech have me so excited? Well, it's a huge segment of the IT market, and we are like, there is a lot of data in FinTech, there's a lot of things just ripe for machine learning. <i>And security is paramount there, it just seems so suited to our strengths and that's what we are seeing</i> . And also we're working with all the banks on projects and we can see how much there is to do. FinTech is, I mean, since my days at Sybase I've been working with FinTech, it's a big industry and there's a lot to do there.		
6	25. At the September 7, 2017 Citi Global Technology Conference, Greene continued to		
7	highlight Google's focus on security and on being a "pioneer" in keeping "customers' data private."		
8	Greene began her speech with a nod to security, stating that it "is the most pervasive problem"		
9	facing any company because a "data breach is so expensive":		
10 11	We've got – we run approximately 1/3 of the world's Internet traffic. And in over the last 3 years, we spent \$29 billion in CapEx, continuing to build out, keeping up with the enormous growth we're seeing.		
12	So I want to start with security because I strongly believe that is the most		
13	pervasive problem every company has. The data breach is so expensive, I think, our health record is \$400 a health record if you get breached. And so Google, with		
14	all the information we have and the need to keep our customers' data private, has had to be a pioneer, and we feel pretty good about where we are in security, not		
15	that we aren't vigilant with our 800-plus dedicated security engineers every day. But I would say, all of Google's some-30,000-plus engineers are kind of security		
16	<i>engineers, and we've built security into every layer of the system</i> . From proprietary purpose-built chips like Titan that say that the hardware hasn't been tampered with and you're running a binary you think you are to every layer of the stack on up to the		
17	software that detects a phishing attack and then in your mail and then says if		
18	someone tries – if you gave the password and someone tries to use it, it says, "Are you sure this person should have your password or do you want to change your password?"		
19	And we've also developed perimeter-less security, because if you just have a		
20 21	firewall protecting everything, if someone gets inside, you're kind of in trouble. And so we can look at what you're doing, where you're coming from and what call you're making, so that many, many of our services, Google services are just out there on the		
22	open Internet, because we can protect them much better than we could with a firewall.		
23	And you take something like a Chromebook with its – the Chrome OS tiny		
24	attack surface updated in the Cloud constantly. You don't get a Ransomware attack then or something like Heartbleed a few years ago. Google had that patched before it		
25	was publicly announced.		
26	26. Although he was not one of Google's founders, Google's CEO, Pichai, embraced and		
27	perpetuated this mantra, as he demonstrated in this January 24, 2018 statement:		
28	I think today we always think we operate under the framework that users use Google because they trust us and it is something easy to lose if you are not good stewards of		
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 it. So we work hard to earn the trust every day. You know one of the bigg concerns of data as you saw through last year is security of data. So for examp when you use G-mail we work hard to make sure we keep your e-mail safe from kinds of attacks that's possible. And I think that's the framework by which yoperate. But I think that I always think data belongs to the user and as companies are only stewards of it. 	le, all we
27. Consistent with Pichai's statement, for years, the Companies acknowledge	d the risks
of their intertwined dependence on technology and trust, including in the "Risk Factors"	section of
Alphabet's 2017 Annual Report on Form 10-K ("2017 10-K"), which assured investor	s that "we
expect to continue to expend significant resources to maintain state-of-the-art security p	orotections
that shield against theft and security breaches," but warned of the following risks, amor	ng others:
7(a)"Privacy concerns relating to our technology could damage our reput deter current and potential users or customers from our products and (Emphasis in original.)	
11 (b) "If our security measures are breached resulting in the improper	use and
12 12 13 13	legrade or ducts and
15services may be perceived as not being secure, users and customers may stop using our products and services, and we may incur significant financial exposure." (Emphasis in original.)	
15 (c) "Concerns about our practices with regard to the collection, use, disc security of personal information or other privacy related matters, even if u could damage our reputation and adversely affect our operating results."	nfounded,
 (d) "Any systems failure or compromise of our security that results in the releases" data, or in our or our users' ability to access such data, could serie our reputation and brand and, therefore, our business, and impair our abilit 	usly harm
and retain users."	y to attract
 (e) "Our security measures may also be breached due to employee error, ma system errors or vulnerabilities, including vulnerabilities or our vendors, their products, or otherwise." 	
21	
(f) "Such breach or unauthorized access, increased government surveillance, or by outside parties to fraudulently induce employees, users, or customers to consisting information in order to gain access to our data or our users" or our	to disclose
23 sensitive information in order to gain access to our data or our users' or c data could result in significant legal and financial exposure, dama	ge to our
24 reputation, and a loss of confidence in the security of our products and se could potentially have an adverse effect on our business."	rvices that
25 28. Beyond these risk warnings, Alphabet informed investors of the followin	g realized
26 risk: "We experience cyber attacks of varying degrees on a regular basis."	
27 29. Echoing the importance of data security to the Companies at the February	y 13, 2018
28 Goldman Sachs Technology & Internet Conference, Greene stated that "security, first and ^{1553457_1} CONSOLIDATED AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR VIOLATION OF THE FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS- 4:18-cv-06245-JSW	foremost" - 9

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1	was Google's competitive advantage versus other cloud providers because of Google's
2	sophistication at security matters and its history of discovering major vulnerabilities:
3	Heather Anne Bellini - Goldman Sachs Group Inc., Research Division - MD & Analyst
4	Right. So if you were sitting down with a CIO and they asked you, "What are
5	your top 3 competitive advantages versus the other cloud providers?" What would be those 3 things?
6	Diane B. Greene - Alphabet Inc. – Director
7	Yes. Well, I'd say it's security, first and foremost, simply because I don't
8	think anyone can afford not to be as secure as possible. And we've – not only do we discover these major problems, like the [Speck Hammer] or the Heartbleed and what
9	have you, but we also – like with 1.4 billion Gmail accounts, we see everything. We can tell you, "Hey, someone – you just gave away your password. Are you sure you
10	wanted to do it because we're not going to let them log in if you want to change your password?" And so we're even that sophisticated now. And so – and then what
11	we're doing increasingly with GCP. So I say security and just because it's just so important. And then it's data analytics and machine learning and AI and
12 13	30. Alphabet's Chief Financial Officer ("CFO"), Ruth Porat ("Porat"), told analysts at the
13	February 26, 2018 Morgan Stanley Technology, Media & Telecom Conference that because of "all
	that's going on with security" and the fact that security is "clearly what we've built Google on," the
15 16	continued monetization of Google's advertised focus on privacy and security would remain a key
10	strategic priority of the Companies:
18	And then in terms of the key strategic priorities, they are the ones that we've been talking about for quite some time, and they really play to our strengths. One of the
19	most important is all that's going on with security. We believe we're a leader in security. It's clearly what we've built Google on. And we're continuing to raise the ber there just the extraordinery engineers we have. We're new taking this to the
20	bar there, just the extraordinary engineers we have. We're now taking this to the next level. And one of the things that we talked about is through 2017, with the development of a proprietary security chip that really enables us to take identification
21	and authentication into hardware. So it's not just about software, it's also about hardware.
22	The Google+ Social Media Platform –
23	A "Social Layer" Across All Google Services
24	31. Google launched the Google+ platform in June 2011 in an attempt to make a social
25	media network to rival that of Facebook and Twitter, and to join all users of Google services (<i>i.e.</i> ,
26	Search, Gmail, YouTube, Maps) into a single online identity. As explained in March 2012 by then-
27	Senior Vice President of Social, Vic Gundotra, "[a]t its simplest level, Google+ is a social layer
28 1553457_1	CONSOLIDATED AMENDED COMDLAINT EOD VIOLATION OF THE FEDERAL SECURITIES
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across all of Google's services." Pichai similarly admitted to *Forbes* in February 2015 that
 "Google+ has always meant two things" for the company:

3 "There's the stream in the product that you see." But Google+ also provided a way for the company to ensure users were signed in to its services with "a common identity across our products," he said. "The second part was in many ways even 4 more important than the first part. That part has worked really well for us.' 5 32. Because the company initially viewed Google+ as "the next version of Google," 6 defendants integrated Google+ into every other Google service, with former CEO Page even tying 7 employee bonuses to the success of the Google+ platform. For instance, in late 2011. Google 8 changed the sign up process for Gmail, whereby creating a Google or Gmail account would 9 automatically create a Google+ profile. Google also released the Hangouts messaging app in 2011, 10 which required a Google+ account to use. In 2013, Google similarly announced that users would be 11 required to log in to a Google+ account in order to leave comments on YouTube. Even Google 12 Search – the cornerstone of Google's business and one of the most frequented destinations on the 13 Internet – was integrated into the Google+ platform with the "Search plus Your World" feature in 14 2012. 15 In Early 2018, Google Faced Unprecedented **Public and Regulatory Scrutiny for Its Data** 16 **Collection and Privacy Practices** 17 33. By the spring of 2018, the trustworthiness of technology and those who control it 18 were under unprecedented scrutiny. A pivotal moment was on March 17, 2018, when *The Observer* 19 and the New York Times published reports alleging that research firm Cambridge Analytica 20 improperly harvested data from Facebook users' profiles. The immediate effects of these allegations 21 were devastating to Facebook and its investors. For example, in the week following the publication 22 of these reports, Facebook's common stock suffered its third worst week in the company's history, 23 declining more than 13% and losing approximately \$75 billion of market capitalization. Almost 24 immediately, Congressional hearings into Facebook's leak of user information to third-party 25 Cambridge Analytica were underway and threatened to turn to Google's data collection and privacy 26 practices: 27 28 1553457_1 CONSOLIDATED AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR VIOLATION OF THE FEDERAL SECURITIES

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1	(a) On March 26, 2018, the <i>Washington Post</i> published an article titled "Congress
2	wants to drag Google and Twitter into Facebook's privacy crisis," which reported that:
3	The Senate Judiciary Committee's chairman, Republican Sen. Chuck
4	Grassley (Iowa), on Monday scheduled an April 10 hearing on the "future of data privacy and social media" – and the panel said it would explore potential new "rules
5	of the road" for those companies.
6	* * *
7	[T]he Senate Judiciary Committee's hearing spells the first time that congressional lawmakers have expanded their scrutiny to include Zuckerberg's peers, Google CEO
8	Sundar Pichai and Twitter CEO Jack Dorsey. The result could be a hearing that exposes both of those tech giants – whose data is not known to have been taken by
9	Cambridge Analytica – to uncomfortable questions about the extent to which they profit from their users' most personal data, too.
10	(b) As later explained by Senator Charles Grassley, Google and Pichai "declined
11	to come before Congress and the American people" for the April 2018 hearings, "asserting that the
12	problems surrounding Facebook and Cambridge Analytica did not involve Google."
13	(c) On April 10, 2018, Senator Grassley sent a letter to Pichai outlining the
14	Senate Judiciary Committee's "significant concerns regarding the data security practices of large
15	social media platforms and their interactions with third party developers and other commercials users
16	of such data," along with 14 questions to fully "understand how Google manages and monitors user
17	privacy for the significant amounts of data which it collects."
18	(d) An April 13, 2018 article in <i>The New York Times</i> titled "Facebook Takes the
19	Punches While Rest of Silicon Valley Ducks" detailed the heightened concern at Google of
20	increased regulatory scrutiny following the Facebook/Cambridge Analytica hearings:
21	Mr. Zuckerberg was prepared to say that his company accounts for just a slice of the \$650 billion advertising market and that it has plenty of competitors. Google,
22	for example, has an online advertising business more than twice the size of
23	Facebook's. And Google also collects vast amounts of information about the people who use its online services.
24	* * *
25	"Outside of Facebook, there is probably no company paying more attention"
26	than Google, said Jason Kint, a frequent critic of Google and Facebook and chief executive of Digital Content Next, a trade group that represents entertainment and news organizations, including The New York Times, "They're absolutely dualing
27	news organizations, including The New York Times. "They're absolutely ducking for cover while the heat is on Facebook. They don't want to try to trip any alarms."
28	* * *
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Over two days of hearings, Google was referenced 11 times by lawmakers. Twitter was mentioned 10 times and Amazon once. Apple was mentioned three times, mostly in passing.

Google employees said they had not received explicit orders from management to keep a low profile because most already understood the risk. One employee, who spoke on the condition of anonymity because workers were not allowed to speak publicly on the issue, said there was an understanding inside Google that the company was the obvious next target.

In a statement, Aaron Stein, a Google spokesman, said the company was "completely focused on protecting our users' data" and "will take action" if it found evidence of "deceptive behavior or misuse of personal data."

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8 34. In addition to the heightened regulatory scrutiny on data collection and privacy issues 9 in the United States, the spring of 2018 also saw the public's attention focused on the 10 implementation of the GDPR, which went into effect in May 2018. The GDPR is a new European 11 Union framework that reformed data privacy protections in all member-states and has implications 12 for businesses and individuals across Europe and beyond. Under the terms of the GDPR, disclosure 13 of data breaches is obligatory: "In the case of a personal data breach, the controller shall *without* undue delay and, where feasible, not later than 72 hours after having become aware of it, notify the 14 personal data breach to the supervisory authority "Failure to follow the GDPR's guidelines can 15 result in fines "[u]p to €10 million, or 2% of the worldwide annual revenue of the prior financial 16

17 year, whichever is higher."

18 35. The public focus on the GDPR was not lost on Google. Starting in May of 2017, 19 Google began issuing several blogs on its official website, The Keyword, detailing the steps it was 20 taking to fully comply with the GDPR. In an August 8, 2017 blog post, William Malcolm 21 ("Malcolm"), the Director of Privacy Legal EMEA, stressed that Google "is committed to complying 22 with the GDPR across all of [its] services" and that its "aim is always to keep data private and safe." 23 Less than a year later, Malcom again reaffirmed Google's dedication to data privacy protections 24 emphasizing that it had been working on GDPR compliance efforts for over 18 months, that "Google 25 has built a strong global privacy compliance program," and that its "ambition is to have the highest 26 possible standards [for] data security and privacy."

27 36. Google was even more focused on data security issues because, in addition to the 28 many universal issues, Google was operating under a Consent Order with the Federal Trade CONSOLIDATED AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR VIOLATION OF THE FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS-4:18-cv-06245-JSW

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1	Commission ("FTC"). The order resulted from a complaint filed in 2011 against Google's social
2	network Google Buzz, the predecessor to Google+. The FTC concluded that Google violated its
3	privacy promises and misrepresented to users of its email services how their information could be
4	used, in some instances private information was shared publicly by default. In the end, the Consent
5	Order, the first decision of its kind, required Google to do the following (among other obligations):
6	(a) establish and implement a comprehensive privacy program;
7 8	(b) maintain privacy controls that are appropriate to its size and complexity, the nature and scope of its activities, and the sensitivity of covered information;
8 9	(c) maintain privacy controls that meet or exceed the protections required by the Consent Order; and
10 11	(d) demonstrate that its privacy controls are operating with sufficient effectiveness to provide reasonable assurance to protect the privacy of covered information and have so operated throughout each two-year reporting period through year 2031.
12	As Public Pressure Mounted, Defendants Learned of Major Data-Security Problems
13	37. In March 2018, Google learned that it had realized the risks it had been warning about
14	for years. Its data privacy protections were not as trustworthy as it had previously believed.
15	Specifically, it learned of a software glitch in its Google+ social networking site that gave hundreds
16	of third-party developers potential access to the private user profile data for Google+ users (the
17	"Three-Year Bug"). This private information included birth dates, photos, occupations, relationship
18	status, email addresses, and home addresses. Worse, Google's security controls were so inadequate
19 20	that it failed to detect this Three-Year Bug for approximately 150 weeks, yet it could only identify
20	two weeks' worth of users whose private profile information had been exposed. Without sufficient
21	record keeping, Google could only estimate that it exposed to third-parties the personal private data
23	of hundreds of thousands of users, but this estimate was based on projections from less than 2% of
24	the Three-Year Bug's lifespan, and Google had no way of determining how many third-parties had
25	misused its users' personal private data. Google did not call or otherwise contact a single third-party
26	developer to investigate the fallout from the bug.
27	38. A group of over 100 of Google's best and brightest engineers, product managers, and
28	lawyers were responsible for uncovering the Three-Year Bug and fixing it, but they could not
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confirm the damage from it or determine the number of other bugs. In or about early April 2018, 1 2 Google's legal and policy staff prepared a memo concerning this security breach, including the many 3 shortcomings in Google's security system and record keeping, which revealed previously unknown, 4 or unappreciated, security vulnerabilities that made additional data exposures virtually inevitable 5 (the Three-Year Bug and these additional vulnerabilities are collectively referred to as the "Privacy Bug" and the memo discussing them, the "Privacy Bug Memo"). The Privacy Bug Memo warned 6 7 that disclosure of the Privacy Bug would likely trigger "immediate regulatory interest" and result 8 in defendants "coming into the spotlight alongside or even instead of Facebook despite having 9 stayed under the radar throughout the Cambridge Analytica scandal." The Privacy Bug Memo also 10 warned that disclosure "almost guarantees Sundar [Pichai] will testify before Congress."

39. Defendant Pichai and other senior Google executives received and read the Privacy
Bug Memo in or about early April 2018.

13 Not Doing the Right Thing – Defendants Hid the Truth

- 40. Despite being fully briefed on the Privacy Bug, Pichai approved a plan to hide the Privacy Bug from all users and everyone else outside of the Companies. One of the reasons Pichai approved this concealment plan was because he wanted to avoid any additional regulatory scrutiny, including having to testify before Congress.
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 41. This was such a significant breach and Google's faith in its security was so shaken,
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- 42. Worse, defendants chose to continue making statements concerning data security,
 related risks, and their trustworthiness, but these coordinated statements maintained the same assurances and warnings as before the Privacy Bug's discovery, while concealing the Privacy Bug
 itself. In other words, they decided to do the wrong thing by warning investors of risks that had
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1	already been realized, and concealing the new risks they had discovered and created by concealing			
2	these risks.			
3	43. On April 23, 2018, consistent with his understanding with Pichai, Page signed			
4	Alphabet's SEC Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the period ending March 31, 2018 (the "1Q			
5	2018 10-Q"), which merely incorporated the identical risk disclosures from its 2017 10-K, without			
6	any mention of the Privacy Bug that defendants discovered after Alphabet had filed the 2017 10-K:			
7	Our operations and financial results are subject to various risks and uncertainties, including those described in Part I, Item 1A, "Risk Factors" in our			
8	Annual Report on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2017, which could adversely affect our business, financial condition, results of operations, cash flows,			
9	and the trading price of our common and capital stock. There have been no material changes to our risk factors since our Annual Report on Form 10-K for the year ended			
10	December 31, 2017.			
11	44. On April 23, 2018, Alphabet held an earnings call to discuss its 1Q 2018 results. The			
12	call began with Ellen West ("West"), Alphabet's Head of Investor Relations, referring investors to			
13	the 2017 10-K risk disclosures:			
14	Thank you. Good afternoon, everyone, and welcome to Alphabet's First Quarter 2018 earnings conference call. With us today are Ruth Porat and Sundar			
15	Pichai. Now I'll quickly cover the safe harbor.			
16 17	Some of the statements that we make today may be considered forward looking, including statements regarding our future investments, our long-term growth and innovation, the expected performance of our businesses and our expected level			
18 19	of capital expenditures. These statements involve a number of risks and uncertainties that could cause actual results to differ materially. For more information, please refer to the risk factors discussed in our Form 10-K for 2017 filed with the SEC.			
	45. Without mentioning a word about the Privacy Bug, Pichai assured the public and			
20 21	investors that Google was prepared for the forthcoming GDPR, stressing that the company had			
21	"started working on GDPR compliance over 18 months ago and have been very, very engaged on it."			
22	Beyond mere GDPR compliance, Pichai emphasized that Google has a "very robust and strong			
23	privacy program."			
24	46. On April 25, 2018, Google's Vice President of Public Policy and Government			
	Affairs, Susan Molinari ("Molinari"), responded to Senator Grassley's April 10, 2018 letter on			
26 27	behalf of Pichai. Making no mention of the recently-discovered Privacy Bug, Molinari stated that			
27	"Google has a longstanding commitment to ensuring both that our users share their data only with			
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developers they can trust, and that they understand how developers will use that data," and that the
 company was "committed to protecting our users' data and prohibit developers from requesting
 access to information they do not need."

4 47. On April 27, 2018, Alphabet filed a Proxy Statement with the SEC pursuant to §14(a) 5 of the Exchange Act. The voting matters for the June 6, 2018 Annual Meeting included management's proposed election of 11 directors, including Page and Pichai. Among the stockholder 6 7 proposals was a proposal regarding a report on content governance, which requested that Alphabet 8 "issue a report to shareholders at reasonable cost, omitting proprietary or legally privileged 9 information, reviewing the efficacy of its enforcement of Google's terms of service related to content 10 policies and assessing the risks posed by content management controversies, including election interference, to the company's finances, operations, and reputation." Alphabet opposed that stating 11 12 in relevant part that: "We believe that we have a responsibility to combat the misuse of our 13 platforms and enforce our content policies. And we understand our continuing responsibility to update our users and stockholders on those efforts. We will continue to remain vigilant in this 14 15 regard and plan to make regular public disclosures about our efforts, our results, and our future *plans.*" Alphabet also opposed a proposal requesting that it detail its policies and procedures 16 17 concerning its lobbying efforts. Alphabet's statement in opposition stated, in relevant part: "We are 18 committed to transparency in all areas of our business, including our public policy activities and 19 lobbying expenditures. Google has long been a champion of disclosure and transparency."

48. On June 6, 2018, during Alphabet's Annual Shareholders Meeting, defendant Walker,
reassured shareholders that it had "long been one of the leading companies when it comes to privacy
and security of user data" and that "we are in great pains to make sure that people have great control
and notice over their data." Walker made this statement while he and all others at the Companies
continued to conceal the Privacy Bug throughout June 2018.

49. On July 23, 2018, consistent with his agreement with Pichai, Page signed Alphabet's
SEC Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the period ending June 30, 2018 (the "2Q 2018 10-Q"),
which merely incorporated the identical risk disclosures from its 2017 10-K, without any mention of
the Privacy Bug that defendants discovered after Alphabet had filed the 2017 10-K:
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Our operations and financial results are subject to various risks and uncertainties, including those described in Part I, Item 1A, "Risk Factors" in our Annual Report on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2017, which could adversely affect our business, financial condition, results of operations, cash flows, and the trading price of our common and capital stock. There have been no material changes to our risk factors since our Annual Report on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2017.

5 50. That same day, at the outset of Alphabet's 2Q 2018 earnings call, West again referred
6 investors to the 2017 10-K risk factors with a statement substantively identical to ¶44, and Pichai
7 again highlighted that Google was "always . . . focused on user privacy" and security. West and
8 Pichai made these statements while Pichai and all others at the Companies continued to conceal the
9 Privacy Bug throughout July 2018.

51. The custom and practice of a newspaper of the size and sophistication of the WSJ
would have meant that, by September, the WSJ would have directly or indirectly informed the
Companies that it was investigating the Privacy Bug and their concealment of it. Realizing that the
WSJ could soon expose the Privacy Bug and their concealment of it, Page and Pichai decided that
neither they nor any other representative from the Companies would accept an invitation to testify
before a Senate Intelligence Committee in September 2018. Representatives from the other two
invitees, Facebook and Twitter, appeared and testified – beside an empty chair for Google.

17 52. On September 26, 2018, defendant Enright, Google's Chief Privacy Officer, provided
18 written testimony to the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, which
19 included the following statements:

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• "The foundation of our business is the trust of people that use our services."

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"With advertising, as with all our products, users trust us to keep their personal information confidential and under their control."

• "[A] healthy data ecosystem requires people feel comfortable that all entities who use personal information will be held accountable for protecting it."

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53. Enright echoed these statements in an official Google blog published just two days
earlier. In the blog, Enright highlighted that "users have long entrusted us to be responsible with
their data and we take that trust and responsibility very seriously." In addition, Enright reaffirmed
that "[p]eople deserve to feel comfortable that all entities that use personal information will be held
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1 accountable for protecting it' and that their business model relies on personal data and their "work to 2 comply with evolving data protection laws around the world."

3 54. Enright made these statements while he and the other defendants continued to conceal the Privacy Bug throughout September 2018. 4

5 55. The statements referenced in ¶¶43-53 above omitted to state material facts necessary in order to make them not misleading. Specifically, these statements omitted that in March 2018, 6 7 Google learned that it had realized the risks it had been warning about for years; its data privacy 8 protections were not as trustworthy as it had previously represented and believed; a bug in its 9 Google+ social networking site had given hundreds of third-party developers potential access to the 10 private user profile data for millions of Google+ users (this private information included birth dates, 11 photos, occupations, relationship status, email addresses, and home addresses); its security controls 12 were so inadequate that it failed to detect this bug for approximately 150 weeks, yet it could only 13 identify two weeks' worth of users whose private profile information had been exposed; due to insufficient record keeping, Google could only estimate that it exposed to third-parties the personal 14 15 private data of hundreds of thousands of users, and it had no way of determining how many thirdparties had misused its users' personal private data; that it had identified systemic security 16 17 deficiencies in its Google+ service that rendered additional bugs and data exposures virtually 18 inevitable; and that key officers and directors, including Alphabet's CEO, Google's CEO, Google's 19 General Counsel, and Google's Chief Privacy Officer, had decided to conceal all of this information 20 from everyone outside the Companies. In short, these statements omitted facts that revealed that 21 neither the Companies' technology nor its management was as trustworthy as they had led the 22 public, including investors, to believe. Defendants also concealed the inevitability of all the 23 foregoing risks materializing.

24 56. The SEC requires that a registrant's Form 10-Q set forth any material changes from risk factors as previously disclosed in the registrant's last Form 10-K. The 1Q 2018 10-Q and 2Q 25 26 2018 10-Q incorporated by reference the 2017 10-K risk disclosures and did not disclose any new 27 risks. Accordingly, the 1Q 2018 10-Q and 2Q 2018 10-Q were materially misleading because they failed to disclose another category of risk: the risk that the concealment itself would be exposed, 28 1553457_1 CONSOLIDATED AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR VIOLATION OF THE FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS- 4:18-cv-06245-JSW - 19

1 which would trigger a host of immediate negative consequences, including reputational harm, 2 diminished trust, intense regulatory scrutiny, higher expenses (including increased legal, PR, 3 lobbying, and investigative expenses), just to name a few. Indeed, defendants knew that they could 4 not keep the Privacy Bug concealed forever – too many people were aware of it, it was incendiary, 5 and it was the final straw for shutting down Google+ – so they knew that it and their concealment of it would eventually be exposed, but they made the decision to buy time. Defendants calculated that 6 7 the detrimental effects would be even worse if, at the time Facebook was getting pummeled in 8 Congress, in the public, and in the financial markets, Google announced that it simply had no 9 confidence in its data protections for hundreds of millions of users.

10 57. On October 8, 2018, the WSJ revealed the Three-Year Bug and the Companies'
11 concealment of it.

12 58. In a blog posted contemporaneously to the publication of the WSJ article, Google 13 admitted to the exposure of hundreds of thousands of users' private data and that it was shutting down its Google+ social networking site and service for consumers because Google had failed to 14 15 develop a product consumers wanted to use, including one with adequate controls over Google+ users' private data, which the blog described as "significant challenges" that the authors of the 16 17 Privacy Bug Memo had "highlight[ed]." Google's statements on the Three-Year Bug did not dispute 18 Pichai's reported receipt of the Privacy Bug Memo in or around early April 2018 or his involvement 19 in the decision to conceal the Privacy Bug from users, regulators, and everyone else outside of the 20 Companies. In the months following the WSJ article's publication, and in multiple statements 21 relating to the Privacy Bug, none of defendants disputed a single fact from the article.

59. On October 10, 2018, three Democratic Senators wrote to the FTC Chairman,
demanding an investigation into the Three-Year Bug, including Google's concealment of it. The
letter highlighted the deceptiveness of Google's response to the *WSJ*'s article, including the
following:

Google has claimed that it "found no evidence that any developer was aware of this bug, or abusing the API" These denials clash with the fact that Google has insufficient records to determine whether a breach occurred. According to its statement, the company only kept logs for two weeks. Google can only account for whether the vulnerability had been exploited in the weeks preceding its discovery. CONSOLIDATED AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR VIOLATION OF THE FEDERAL SECURITIES

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As such, we may never know the full extent of the damage caused by the failure to provide adequate controls and protection to users.

- 2 60. Google "found no evidence" because it barely looked – reviewing data from less 3 than 2% of the Three-Year Bug's lifespan, and there is "no evidence" that Google so much as called 4 or contacted a single third-party developer. The Democratic Senators went on to explain how the 5 revelation of Google's concealment of the Three-Year Bug revealed a corporate culture that bore no 6 resemblance to one that "do[esn't] be evil" and "do[es] the right thing": "The awareness and 7 approval by Google management to not disclose represents a culture of concealment and opacity set 8 from the top of the company." 9
- Google's scheme did manage to unite the country's two political parties. On October 61. 10 11, 2018, three Republican Senators wrote a letter to Pichai that read, in part, "[a]t the same time that 11 Facebook was learning the important lesson that tech firms must be forthright with the public about 12 privacy issues, Google apparently elected to withhold information about a relevant vulnerability for 13 fear of public scrutiny." The Republican Senators also confirmed the misleading nature of Enright's 14 September 26, 2018 statements (see above): "We are especially disappointed given that Google's 15 chief privacy officer testified before the Senate Commerce Committee on the issue of privacy on 16 September 26, 2018 – just two weeks ago – and did not take the opportunity to provide information 17 regarding this very relevant issue to the Committee." 18
- 62. On October 11, 2018, Senator Grassley wrote to Pichai regarding the "troubling reports" detailed in the *WSJ* article, and condemned Google's evasive responses to congressional inquiry earlier that year:
 - Given your and Google's unwillingness to participate [in the April 10, 2018 Facebook/Cambridge Analytica hearing], I sent you a letter seeking information on Google's current data privacy policies, specifically as they relate to Google's third party developer APIs. Your responses to my questions highlighted Google's application verification process, the continuous monitoring of applications through machine learning, and the use of manual audits, all to ensure robust protection of user data.
 - Despite your contention that Google did not have the same data protection failures as Facebook, it appears from recent reports that Google+ had an almost identical feature to Facebook, which allowed third party developers to access information from users as well as private information of those users' connections. Moreover, it appears that you were aware of this issue at the time I invited you to participate in the hearing and sent you the letter regarding Google's policies.
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1 63. The WSJ article, Google's blog post, and the letters described in the preceding
 2 paragraphs contained enough information for investors to piece together that the Three-Year Bug
 3 was a symptom of the disease comprising the Privacy Bug.

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4 64. As defendants had anticipated, just weeks after the WSJ revelations, defendants 5 disclosed another Google+ bug had exposed user data from 52.5 million accounts. Defendants admitted that "users were impacted." Unlike the Three-Year Bug, which defendants deliberately 6 7 concealed from users and the investing public, defendants disclosed this new bug in a December 10, 8 2018 blog post and began notifying the impacted users. Defendants also announced they were 9 accelerating the shuttering of the consumer Google+ platform to April 2019 rather than August 10 2019, a further confirmation of Google's inability to protect users' personal and private information. 11 Defendants' disclosure came just hours before Pichai was set to testify before the House Judiciary 12 Committee.

13 65. Throughout the years, as discussed above, defendants repeatedly acknowledged that the Companies' success is largely dependent on maintaining consumers' trust such that users will 14 15 continue to entrust Google with their private data, which Google can then monetize. As one media outlet put it: "Google has a strong incentive to position itself as a trustworthy guardian of personal 16 17 information because, like Facebook, its financial success hinges on its success to learn about the 18 interests, habits and location of its users in order to sell targeted ads." Fully aware of consumers' 19 expectations that their private information will remain private, defendants repeatedly promised they 20 would not only keep the information private but that they would notify users if their information was 21 impacted.

22 66. The revelation that millions of users' data had been potentially exposed and that 23 rather than notify users of the exposure, defendants chose to cover it up was a massive breach of 24 consumers' trust, as well as a realization that Google had failed to develop adequate systems and 25 controls to maintain the integrity of its users' private data. As one commentator put it: "Google's 26 business model is based on trust, and hiding a potentially dangerous breach for six months is not the 27 way to keep it." Another observed that through its "digital coverup . . . Google has demonstrated 28 that it cannot be relied on to protect privacy." Thus, the disclosure of the Privacy Bug and its 1553457_1 CONSOLIDATED AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR VIOLATION OF THE FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS- 4:18-cv-06245-JSW - 22

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impact on users damaged Google's reputation and, thus, value. Indeed, the *WSJ*'s investigation,
 based on internal documents, revealed that in choosing to cover up the Privacy Bug, defendants
 sought to avoid regulatory scrutiny and reputational damage. Defendants were right to be
 concerned. Upon disclosure of the Privacy Bug and subsequent cover up, industry commentators
 noted increased regulatory scrutiny and that regulatory investigations were sure to come.

6 67. A *CNBC* article titled "Google learned the hard way it's better to be transparent about
7 privacy bugs than cover them up" noted "[c]onsumers and regulators have shown they will judge
8 companies far more harshly for covering up data security issues than for openly discussing them."
9 That same article drew similarities between Google's cover-up of the Three-Year Bug and Uber's
10 revelation of a data breach it had tried to cover up, noting the incident "was relatively minor except
11 for the cover-up." As of October 2018, Uber has paid nearly \$150 million in settlements related to
12 the revelation and is subject to increased monitoring by the FTC for 20 years.

- 13 68. As predicted by *CNBC*, the very regulatory, legal, and reputational risks that the Companies warned about while defendants covered up the Privacy Bug materialized. For one thing, 14 15 German regulators in Hamburg, where Google has its German office, have initiated an investigation into Google's handling of the Privacy Bug. In addition, regulators in Ireland indicated they "will be 16 17 seeking information on these issues from Google," referring to the Privacy Bug and Google's 18 response to it. U.S. Senator Richard Blumenthal called for a full FTC investigation into the Privacy 19 Bug. Several private lawsuits on behalf of consumers and shareholders have been filed against 20 Google as a result of the Privacy Bug.
- 21 69. On November 2, 2018, Google announced that Molinari, the head of Google's
 22 Americas policy who drafted Pichai's response to Senator Grassley's April 10, 2018 letter, was
 23 stepping down from her role.
- 70. With the Companies' scheme exposed, Pichai testified before Congress on December
 11, 2018. The ranking member's opening remarks specifically highlighted the Privacy Bug,
 including Google's concealment of it. As featured below, in neither his prepared opening remarks
 nor during any portion of his testimony did Pichai deny his awareness of the Privacy Bug for months
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before disclosure, nor his involvement in the decision to conceal the Privacy Bug until the WSJ
 exposed it:

3 (a) "We take privacy seriously. The bugs you mentioned are bugs we found them
4 by either doing an audit ";

5 (b) "Building software inevitably has bugs associated as part of the process. We
6 actually undertake a lot of efforts to find bugs, so we find it, [root it] out, and fix it, and that is how
7 we constantly make our systems better."

8 (c) "The biggest area we see for our users is around security, that their account
9 gets hacked or something. That is why we work hard."

10 71. Pichai battled questions about the data breach from the House Committee while also
11 repeatedly emphasizing the Companies' aged mantra of trustworthiness through data protection:

(a) "Protecting the privacy and security of our users has long been an essential
part of our mission."

(b) "We have invested an enormous amount of work over the years to bringchoice, transparency, and control to our users. These values are built into every product we make."

16 (c) "Today, for any service we provide our users, we go to great lengths to protect
17 their privacy and we give them transparency, choice, and control."

18 (d) "I am of the opinion we are better off with more of an overarching data19 production framework."

20 72. On February 5, 2019, Alphabet filed with the SEC its Form 10-K Annual Report for
 2018, its first annual report since the revelation of the Privacy Bug, including the Companies'
 22 concealment of it. Unlike the 2017 "Risk Factors" that Alphabet had incorporated into its 1Q 2018
 23 10-Q and its 2Q 2018 10-Q, the 2018 "Risk Factors" finally acknowledged that "*[b]ugs or defects in* 24 *our products and services have occurred and may occur in the future*." (Emphasis in original.)
 25 ADDITIONAL SCIENTER ALLEGATIONS

The facts detailed in ¶¶38-40, establish that Pichai and senior Google executives had
 actual knowledge of the Privacy Bug by early April 2018. Specifically, in or about early April 2018,
 senior Google executives, including Pichai, were personally notified that a bug in its Google+ social
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1 networking site gave hundreds of third-party developers potential access to the private user profile 2 data for Google+ users (this private information included birth dates, photos, occupations, 3 relationship status, email addresses, and home addresses) who never intended to publicly share this 4 private data. Pichai and senior Google executives received this information in the Privacy Bug 5 Memo, which was prepared by Google's legal and policy staff. Given that Google failed to detect the bug for approximately 150 weeks but only kept two-weeks' worth of activity logs necessary to 6 7 determine which users were affected and what types of data may potentially have been improperly 8 collected, the Privacy Bug Memo stated that Google had no way of determining how many third-9 parties had misused the personal private data of a likewise unknown number of users. Likewise, the 10 Privacy Bug Memo revealed systemic security deficiencies in Google's Google+ service that 11 rendered additional bugs and data exposures virtually inevitable. Google admitted in its October 8, 12 2018 blog post that it discovered and remediated the lone Three-Year Bug in March 2018, but that 13 was just the tip of the iceberg.

14 74. The facts detailed above, when viewed collectively and holistically with the other 15 allegations in this Complaint, establish a strong inference that each of the defendants knew or 16 recklessly disregarded that each of the statements set forth in ¶¶43-53 would be, and were, 17 misleading to investors at the time they were made. This inference is far stronger than the 18 alternative: that the 100-person task force, which discovered the largest data-security vulnerability 19 in the history of two Companies whose existence depends on data security, concealed it from the 20 Companies' CEOs, as well as Google's Chief Privacy Officer and General Counsel – who both had 21 primary responsibility for data-security issues at Google.

22 75. Defendants' scienter can also be inferred from the *cover-up* of the Privacy Bug. 23 Specifically, the Companies' employees would not uniformly conceal the Privacy Bug without a 24 directive to do so from the Individual Defendants, who were the individuals most responsible for 25 responding to data-security issues. The Individual Defendants would have to have been informed 26 and exercised their decision-making authority to conceal the Privacy Bug while persisting with the 27 same pre-discovery assurances and risk warnings when that decision was largely driven by the desire to avoid regulatory scrutiny, Pichai's Congressional testimony, and reputational damage. Indeed, the 28 1553457_1 CONSOLIDATED AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR VIOLATION OF THE FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS- 4:18-cv-06245-JSW - 25

Privacy Bug Memo expressly warned that disclosure of the Privacy Bug would likely trigger
 "immediate regulatory interest" and "almost guarantees Sundar [Pichai] will testify before
 Congress." Accordingly, defendants covered up the Privacy Bug until the publication of the WSJ
 article.

5 76. Defendants' scienter can likewise be inferred from their immediate announcement of significant and extensive *remedial measures* on the day that the WSJ article was released, including 6 the shuddering of Google+ - the world's fifth largest social media network. Also on October 8, 7 8 2018, Google announced a sweeping set of data privacy measures as part of its response to the 9 events described in the WSJ article, including: (1) launching more granular Google Account 10 permissions to give consumers "more fine-grained control over what account data they choose to share with each app"; (2) limiting the applications that may seek permission to access users' Gmail 11 data; and (3) limiting the ability of applications to ask for permission to access information in users' 12 13 telephones. In addition, Google pledged that "[i]n the coming months, we'll roll out additional controls and update policies across more of our APIs." These are the types of decisions that the 14 15 Companies consider and study for months, not minutes, before making them.

16 77. Defendants' scienter may be further inferred from other facts alleged herein,17 including that:

(a) defendants had been repeatedly warned of and were aware of the significant,
and potentially existential, risks to the Companies arising from the public discovering a data breach;
(b) defendants knew that providing truthful, accurate, and complete disclosures
would threaten their business model, as it would expose them to regulatory scrutiny, reputational

22 damage, and Pichai's testimony being sought by Congress;

(c) Google was subject to an FTC consent decree at the time the statements were
 made, providing defendants with heightened awareness of the risks of and their responsibilities with
 respect to violating user privacy rights;

 26 (d) Pichai and Page's reluctance to testify before Congress at a time when
 27 Facebook was being pilloried for a data leak was a powerful incentive for defendants to approve
 28 Google's decision to cover up the Privacy Bug, as evidenced by their widely publicized refusal to CONSOLIDATED AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR VIOLATION OF THE FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS- 4:18-cv-06245-JSW - 26

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accept the United States Senate Select Committee on Intelligence's invitation to testify about
 election interference in September 2018, and the Privacy Bug Memo's explicit warning that
 disclosure "almost guarantees Sundar [Pichai] will testify before Congress"; and

4 (e) the omissions at issue concerned one of the most significant issues and severe
5 risks that Alphabet faced.

78. The below-listed defendants held high-level positions and had access to material,
adverse, non-public information concerning specific and imminent privacy risks facing Google,
including the Privacy Bug and the repercussions of disclosing it:

9 (a) Page founded Google, was the chief operating decision maker of Alphabet and
10 was responsible for making, and did make, key operating decisions at Google. Pichai directly
11 reported to, and was directly accountable to, and maintained regular contact with, Page.² Page
12 received weekly reports of Google's operating results.

(b) Enright was Google's Chief Privacy Officer since September 2018. Prior to
that, he was the "Legal Director of Privacy" at Google since 2016. In May of 2018, Enright was
named Google's DPO for the purpose of the GDPR, which requires Google to "ensure that the data
protection officer is involved, properly and *in a timely manner, in all issues which relate to the protection of personal data*." Enright's DPO responsibilities began on May 24, 2018.

(c) Walker has been Google's General Counsel since 2006. In providing written
testimony to the Senate in November 2017, Walker stated that he leads Google's "legal, policy, trust
and safety, and corporate philanthropy teams." In August 2018, Walker became Google's Senior
Vice President for Global Affairs.

79. Because of their positions, Enright and Walker: (1) comprise or oversee Google's
Privacy and Data Protection Office, the "council of top product executives who oversee key
decisions relating to privacy," which deliberated on whether to notify users of the Privacy Bug at or
shortly after the time it was discovered; and (2) comprise or oversee the "legal and policy staff" that
prepared the Privacy Bug Memo.

- $\begin{bmatrix} 27 \\ 28 \end{bmatrix}^2$ As Google's CEO, Pichai was responsible for making, and did make, key operating decisions at Google. As set forth above, Pichai was a direct recipient of the Privacy Bug Memo.
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80. 1 In connection with Alphabet's 1Q 2018 10-Q and 2Q 2018 10-Q, Page signed 2 certifications pursuant to Exchange Act Rules 13a-14(a) and 15(d)-14(a), as adopted pursuant to 3 §302 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. In these certifications, Page declared that he and Porat 4 were responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls (as defined in Exchange Act 5 Rule 13a-15(e)), and that they "[d]esigned such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under [their] supervision, to ensure that material 6 7 information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to 8 [them] by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being 9 prepared." Page further certified that he and Porat "[e]valuated the effectiveness of the registrant's 10 disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report [their] conclusions about the 11 effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this 12 report based on such evaluation." Pursuant to the SEC's February 21, 2018, "Statement and 13 Guidance on Public Company Cybersecurity Disclosures," Release Nos. 33-10459, 34-82746, any such certifications made pursuant to Exchange Act Rules 13a-14(a) and 15(d)-14(a) "should take 14 15 into account the adequacy of controls and procedures for identifying cybersecurity risks and incidents and for assessing and analyzing their impact." Therefore, prior to vouching for the 16 accuracy of the statements made in Alphabet's 1Q 2018 10-Q and 2Q 2018 10-Q, Page was 17 18 obligated to familiarize himself with the adequacy and controls for identifying cybersecurity risks 19 and incidents and for assessing their impact. Any such review would necessarily involve an analysis 20 of the Privacy Bug, the Privacy Bug Memo, and the conscious decision to continue concealing it in 21 the backdrop of Facebook receiving unprecedented criticism for the Cambridge Analytica data 22 scandal.

23

LOSS CAUSATION/ ECONOMIC LOSS

81. As a result of defendants' scheme, Alphabet was overvalued throughout the Class
Period. Put simply, the Companies' data security and management were less trustworthy than
defendants had led the world to believe. Accordingly, Alphabet's securities were riskier and thus
were worth less than they appeared to be worth.

28

82. The revelation of the facts and circumstances that defendants had misleadingly 1 2 omitted exposed both defendants' scheme and the overvaluation from the scheme. One measure of 3 that inflated value was Alphabet's stock price, which fell \$11.91 on October 8, 2018, \$10.75 on October 9, 2018, and \$53.01 on October 10, 2018. These price drops were caused, in part, by the 4 5 market processing the implications of defendants' scheme. The revelation of defendants' scheme revealed that investors had paid more for Alphabet securities than they would have paid but for the 6 7 scheme. ALPHABET SECURITIES TRADED IN AN EFFICIENT MARKET 8

9 83. The Class Period inflation in the price of Alphabet securities was eliminated when the
10 financial conditions, business risks, and other information concealed by defendants' fraud was
11 revealed to the market.

12 84. At all relevant times, the market for Alphabet securities was an efficient market for13 the following reasons, among others:

(a) Alphabet securities met the requirements for listing, and were listed and
actively traded on the NASDAQ, a highly efficient and automated market;

16 (b) during the Class Period, a high weekly volume of Alphabet securities traded17 on the NASDAQ;

18 (c) as a regulated issuer, Alphabet filed periodic public reports with the SEC and
19 NASDAQ;

20 (d) throughout the Class Period, over a dozen different firms and dozens of
21 analysts covered Alphabet securities;

(e) throughout the Class Period, Alphabet was eligible to file an SEC Registration
Form S-3;

(f) Alphabet regularly communicated with investors via established market
communication mechanisms, including through regular disseminations of press releases on national
circuits of major newswire services, the Internet, and other wide-ranging public disclosures; and
(g) unexpected material news about Alphabet was rapidly reflected in and
incorporated into its stock price.

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85. 1 As a result of the foregoing, the market for Alphabet securities promptly digested 2 current information regarding Alphabet from all publicly available sources and reflected such 3 information in the prices of Alphabet securities. Under these circumstances, all purchasers of 4 Alphabet securities during the Class Period suffered similar injury when the revelation of 5 defendants' scheme removed the artificial inflation that had been part of the price they paid when they purchased Alphabet securities. 6

7 86. A class-wide presumption of reliance is appropriate in this action under the Supreme 8 Court's holding in Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972), because the 9 Class's claims are grounded on defendants' material omissions. Because defendants omitted to state 10 material facts necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under 11 which they were made, not misleading, positive proof of reliance is not required. All that is 12 necessary is that the facts omitted be material in the sense that a reasonable investor might have 13 considered them important in making investment decisions. Given the importance of the Class Period omissions set forth above, that requirement is satisfied here. 14

15

CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS

16 87. Plaintiff brings this action as a class action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) and (b)(3) on behalf of a class consisting of all those who purchased or otherwise 17 18 acquired Alphabet securities between April 23, 2018 and October 7, 2018, inclusive, and who were 19 damaged thereby (the "Class"). Excluded from the Class are defendants, the officers and directors of 20 the Companies, members of their immediate families and legal representatives, heirs, successors, or 21 assigns, and any entity in which defendants have or had a controlling interest.

22 88. The members of the Class are so numerous that joinder of all members is 23 impracticable. Throughout the Class Period, Alphabet securities were extensively traded on the 24 NASDAQ. As of January 31, 2019, Alphabet had 299,360,029 shares of Class A common stock 25 outstanding, 46,535,019 shares of Class B common stock outstanding, and 349,291,348 shares of 26 Class C capital stock outstanding. The exact number of class members can be determined only by 27 appropriate discovery, but Plaintiff believes that there are likely thousands of class members that are 28 geographically dispersed, if not more. Record owners and other members of the Class may be CONSOLIDATED AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR VIOLATION OF THE FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS- 4:18-cv-06245-JSW

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identified from books and records maintained by Alphabet or its transfer agent. Notice can be
 provided to such record owners by a combination of published notice and first-class mail, using
 techniques and a form of notice similar to those customarily used in class actions arising under the
 federal securities laws.

89. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the members
of the Class. Plaintiff has retained competent counsel experienced in class action litigation under the
federal securities laws to further ensure such protection and intends to prosecute this action
vigorously.

9 90. Plaintiff's claims are typical of the claims of the other members of the Class because
10 Plaintiff's and all the class members' damages arise from and were caused by the misleading
11 omissions made by or chargeable to defendants. Plaintiff does not have any interests antagonistic to,
12 or in conflict with, the Class.

13 91. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient 14 adjudication of this controversy. Since the damages suffered by individual class members may be 15 relatively small, the expense and burden of individual litigation make it virtually impossible for the 16 class members to seek redress for the wrongful conduct alleged. Plaintiff knows of no difficulty that 17 will be encountered in the management of this litigation that would preclude its maintenance as a 18 class action.

19 92. Common questions of law and fact exist as to all members of the Class and
20 predominate over any questions solely affecting individual members of the Class. Among the
21 questions of law and fact common to the Class are:

(a) whether the federal securities laws were violated by defendants' acts as
alleged herein;

24 (b) whether defendants' publicly disseminated statements to the investing public
25 during the Class Period omitted material facts;

26

(c) whether defendants failed to convey material facts;

27 (d) whether defendants acted knowingly or with severe recklessness in omitting
 28 material facts;
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
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1	(e) whether the price of Alphabet securities was artificially inflated during the Class Period; and		
3	(f) whether members of the Class have sustained damages, and, if so, the		
4	appropriate measure of damages.		
5	CLAIMS FOR RELIEF		
6	COUNT I		
7	For Violation of §10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 (Against All Defendants)		
8	93. Plaintiff incorporates ¶¶1-92 by reference.		
9	94. During the Class Period, defendants disseminated or approved the statements as		
10	specified above in ¶¶43-53, which they knew or recklessly disregarded, and omitted material facts		
11	necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they were		
12	made, not misleading.		
13	95. Defendants violated §10(b) of the Exchange Act and SEC Rule 10b-5 in that they:		
14	(a) employed devices, schemes, and artifices to defraud;		
15	(b) omitted to state material facts necessary in order to make the statements made,		
16	in light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading; or		
17	(c) engaged in acts, practices, and a course of business that operated as a fraud or		
18	deceit upon Plaintiff and others similarly situated in connection with their purchase of Alphabet		
19	securities during the Class Period.		
20	96. Defendants, individually and together, directly and indirectly, by the use of the means		
21	and instrumentalities of interstate commerce and/or the mails, engaged and participated in a		
22	continuous course of conduct to conceal the truth and/or adverse material information about		
23	Alphabet's business and operations as specified herein.		
24	97. Defendants had actual knowledge of the omitted material facts set forth herein, or		
25	recklessly disregarded the omitted material facts that were available to them.		
26	98. As a result of the dissemination of the misleading information and failure to disclose		
27	material facts, as set forth above, the market price of Alphabet securities was artificially inflated		
28 1553457_1	during the Class Period. In ignorance of the fact that the market price of Alphabet securities was CONSOLIDATED AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR VIOLATION OF THE FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS- 4:18-cv-06245-JSW - 32		

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artificially inflated, Plaintiff and other members of the Class purchased or otherwise acquired 1 2 Alphabet securities during the Class Period at artificially high prices and were damaged thereby. 99. 3 Plaintiff and the Class paid artificially inflated prices for Alphabet securities, and suffered losses when the relevant facts were revealed. Plaintiff and the Class would not have 4 5 purchased or otherwise acquired Alphabet securities at the prices they paid, or at all, if they had been aware that the market prices had been artificially and falsely inflated by these defendants' 6 7 misleading statements. 8 100. As a direct and proximate result of these defendants' wrongful conduct, Plaintiff and 9 other members of the Class suffered damages in connection with their Class Period transactions in 10 Alphabet securities. 101. By reason of the foregoing, defendants named in this Count have violated \$10(b) of 11 12 the Exchange Act and SEC Rule 10b-5. 13 **COUNT II** For Violation of §20(a) of the Exchange Act (Against Defendants Alphabet, Google, Pichai, and Page) 14 15 102. Plaintiff incorporates ¶1-101 by reference. 16 103. Defendants Pichai and Page were controlling persons of Alphabet and Google within 17 the meaning of §20(a) of the Exchange Act. By virtue of their high-level positions as officers and/or 18 directors of the Companies, their ownership and contractual rights, participation in and awareness of 19 the Companies' operations, and intimate knowledge of the statements filed by Alphabet with the 20 SEC and/or disseminated to the investing public, these defendants had the power to influence and 21 control and did influence and control, directly or indirectly, the decision-making of the Companies, 22 including the content and dissemination of the allegedly false and misleading statements. 23 104. In particular, each of these defendants had direct or supervisory responsibility over 24 the day-to-day operations of the Companies and, therefore, are presumed to have had the power to 25 control or influence the particular transactions and business practices giving rise to the securities 26 violations as alleged in Count I, and exercised that power. 27 105. Alphabet controlled Google and the Individual Defendants, and is a controlling 28 person of those defendants within the meaning of \$20(a) of the Exchange Act. 1553457_1 CONSOLIDATED AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR VIOLATION OF THE FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS- 4:18-cv-06245-JSW - 33

1	106.	Google controlled all of its e	mployees, including Pichai, Enright, and Walker, and is a
2	2 controlling person of those defendants within the meaning of §20(a) of the Exchange Act.		
3	107.	As a direct and proximate re	sult of these defendants' wrongful conduct, Plaintiff and
4	other member	rs of the Class suffered damag	es in connection with their purchases and acquisitions of
5	Alphabet secu	urities during the Class Period	d when the relevant truth was revealed.
6	108.	By reason of the foregoing, t	he defendants named in this Count violated §20(a) of the
7	Exchange Act.		
8		PRAY	ER FOR RELIEF
9	WHE	REFORE, Plaintiff prays for	the judgment as follows:
10	А.	Determining that this action	n is a proper class action, certifying Plaintiff as Class
11	Representativ	ve under Rule 23 of the Federa	l Rules of Civil Procedure and designating Lead Counsel
12	as Class Cour	nsel;	
13	В.	Awarding compensatory dar	nages in favor of Plaintiff and other members of the Class
14	against all de	fendants, jointly and severall	y, for all damages sustained as a result of defendants'
15	wrongdoing, in an amount to be proven at trial, including interest thereon;		
16	6 C. Awarding Plaintiff's reasonable costs and expenses, including attorneys' fees and		
17	expert fees; and		
18	D. Awarding such other relief as the Court may deem just and proper.		
19	JURY DEMAND		
20	Plaintiff demands a trial by jury.		
21	DATED: Ap	ril 26, 2019	ROBBINS GELLER RUDMAN & DOWD LLP
22			JASON A. FORGE
23			MICHAEL ALBERT J. MARCO JANOSKI GRAY
24	TING H. LIU		
25			<u>s/ JASON A. FORGE</u> JASON A. FORGE
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1	CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
2	I hereby certify under penalty of perjury that on April 26, 2019, I authorized the electronic
3	filing of the foregoing with the Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF system which will send
4	notification of such filing to the e-mail addresses on the attached Electronic Mail Notice List, and I
5	hereby certify that I caused the mailing of the foregoing via the United States Postal Service to the
6	non-CM/ECF participants indicated on the attached Manual Notice List.
7	<u>s/ JASON A. FORGE</u> JASON A. FORGE
8	ROBBINS GELLER RUDMAN
9	& DOWD LLP 655 West Broadway, Suite 1900
10	San Diego, CA 92101-8498 Telephone: 619/231-1058
11	619/231-7423 (fax)
12	E-mail: jforge@rgrdlaw.com
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Mailing Information for a Case 4:18-cv-06245-JSW In re ALPHABET, INC. SECURITIES LITIGATION

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Manual Notice List

The following is the list of attorneys who are **not** on the list to receive e-mail notices for this case (who therefore require manual noticing). You may wish to use your mouse to select and copy this list into your word processing program in order to create notices or labels for these recipients.

• (No manual recipients)