



# HC3: Analyst Note

October 8, 2024 TLP:CLEAR Report: 202410081500

## The Threat Actors Exploiting F5 Misconfiguration

### Executive Summary

For years, F5 Networks, Inc., a multi-cloud application services and security company’s BIG-IP software and hardware, have been subject to exploitation of its vulnerabilities by various threat actors. The company’s product suite offers various services, including load balancing, DNS, and connectivity for network applications. Its ability to handle high-bandwidth interactions makes it popular among large enterprises and governments, both key targets of both nation-state and cybercrime groups. For this reason, any vulnerability is a significant security risk for F5’s BIG-IP users, as well as third parties whose personal and financial information may be stored on or processed by a vulnerable device. What follows is an overview of the known vulnerabilities, the threat actors that exploit them, a summary of previous cybersecurity advisories concerning F5, MITRE ATT&CK tactics, techniques, and procedures, indicators of compromise, and defense and mitigation recommendations.

### Overview of Vulnerabilities

NVD Published Date	Vulnerability	Description
October 26, 2023	CVE-2023-46748	An authenticated SQL injection vulnerability exists in the BIG-IP Configuration utility that may allow an authenticated attacker with network access to the Configuration utility through the BIG-IP management port and/or self IP addresses to execute arbitrary system commands. Note: Software versions which have reached End of Technical Support (EoTS) are not evaluated.
October 26, 2023	CVE-2023-46747	Undisclosed requests may bypass configuration utility authentication, allowing an attacker with network access to the BIG-IP system through the management port and/or self IP addresses to execute arbitrary system commands. Note: Software versions which have reached End of Technical Support (EoTS) are not evaluated.
May 5, 2022	CVE-2022-1388	On F5 BIG-IP 16.1.x versions prior to 16.1.2.2, 15.1.x versions prior to 15.1.5.1, 14.1.x versions prior to 14.1.4.6, 13.1.x versions prior to 13.1.5, and all 12.1.x and 11.6.x versions, undisclosed requests may bypass iControl REST authentication. Note: Software versions which have reached End of Technical Support (EoTS) are not evaluated.
July 1, 2020	CVE-2020-5902	In BIG-IP versions 15.0.0-15.1.0.3, 14.1.0-14.1.2.5, 13.1.0-13.1.3.3, 12.1.0-12.1.5.1, and 11.6.1-11.6.5.1, the Traffic Management User Interface (TMUI), also referred to as the Configuration utility, has a Remote Code Execution (RCE) vulnerability in undisclosed pages.

### Threat Actors

#### CVE-2023-46748

As of late October 2023, F5 reported that it observed unnamed “skilled” threat actors actively exploiting two recently disclosed and patched vulnerabilities, designated CVE-2023-46747 and CVE-2023-46748. F5 advised that these unnamed threat actors were able to delete signs of their malicious activity on compromised devices. This makes it virtually impossible to determine if a device has been compromised.

#### CVE-2023-46747

During the course of an intrusion investigation in late October 2023, Mandiant observed novel N-day exploitation of CVE-2023-46747 affecting F5 BIG-IP Traffic Management User Interface. Additionally, in February 2024, it observed exploitation of Connectwise ScreenConnect CVE-2024-1709 by the same actor. This mix of custom tooling and the SUPERSHELL framework leveraged in these incidents is assessed with moderate confidence to be unique to a People’s Republic of China (PRC) threat actor, UNC5174.



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Mandiant assesses UNC5174 (believed to use the persona “Uteus”) is a former member of Chinese hacktivist collectives, which has since shown indications of acting as a contractor for China’s Ministry of State Security (MSS) focused on executing access operations. UNC5174 has been observed attempting to sell access to U.S. defense contractor appliances, UK government entities, and institutions in Asia in late 2023 following CVE-2023-46747 exploitation. In February 2024, UNC5174 was observed exploiting a ConnectWise ScreenConnect vulnerability (CVE-2024-1709) to compromise hundreds of institutions primarily in the U.S. and Canada.

UNC5174 has been linked to widespread aggressive targeting and intrusions of Southeast Asian and U.S. research and education institutions, Hong Kong businesses, charities and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and U.S. and UK government organizations during October and November 2023, as well as in February 2024.

UNC5174 at a Glance	
Summary	UNC5174, a Chinese state-sponsored threat actor, has been identified for exploiting critical vulnerabilities in F5 BIG-IP and ScreenConnect. UNC5174 is believed to have connections to China's Ministry of State Security and has been observed using custom tooling and the SUPERSHELL framework in their operations. The actor has shown indications of transitioning from hacktivist collectives to working as a contractor for Chinese intelligence agencies.
Aliases	Uteus
Country of Origin	The People’s Republic of China
Motivation	Enabling espionage operations
Target Countries	The United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, Sweden, Iran, Australia, Hong Kong, South Korea, and other Southeast Asia nations.
Target Sectors	Education, private research and businesses, charities, and non-governmental organizations

Source: Red Hot Cyber

## CVE-2022-1388

In August 2024, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), CISA, and the Department of Defense Cyber Crime Center (DC3) released a joint Cybersecurity Advisory (CSA) to warn network defenders that a group of Iran-based cyber actors continues to exploit U.S. and foreign organizations. This includes organizations across several sectors in the U.S. (including in the education, finance, healthcare, and defense sectors as well as local government entities) and other countries (including in Israel, Azerbaijan, and the United Arab Emirates).

The FBI assesses a significant percentage of these threat actors’ operations against U.S. organizations are intended to obtain and develop network access to then collaborate with ransomware affiliate actors to deploy ransomware. The FBI further assesses these Iran-based cyber actors are associated with the Government of Iran (GOI) and—separate from the ransomware activity—conduct computer network exploitation activity in support of the GOI (such as intrusions enabling the theft of sensitive technical data against organizations in Israel and Azerbaijan).

The Iranian cyber actors’ initial intrusions rely upon exploits of remote external services on internet-facing assets to gain initial access to victim networks. The Iran-based cyber actors have historically exploited



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organizations by leveraging CVE-2022-1388 related to BIG-IP F5 devices.

## CVE-2020-5902

The publication of this vulnerability initially stirred high interest among threat actors. Soon, cybercriminals on underground hacking forums started discussing techniques to enumerate and exploit vulnerable instances. In one instance, a user on a Russian-speaking forum discussed “Google Dorking” techniques to find vulnerable BIG-IP servers indexed by the search engine.

Subsequently, after the publication of the vulnerability’s security advisory, the FBI followed up in early August by issuing a notification that it detected Iranian threat actors attempting to exploit the vulnerability since July. Further reports from security researchers confirmed that Iranian threat actor Pioneer Kitten had been observed exploiting the vulnerability to achieve initial compromise on their targets, and had begun selling access to compromised networks on dark web forums.

PIONEER KITTEN at a Glance	
Summary	PIONEER KITTEN is an Iran-based adversary that has been active since at least 2017 and has a suspected nexus to the Iranian government. This adversary appears to be primarily focused on gaining and maintaining access to entities possessing sensitive information of likely intelligence interest to the Iranian government.
Aliases	PARISITE, UNC757, Fox Kitten
Country of Origin	The Islamic Republic of Iran
Motivation	Enabling espionage operations
Target Countries	Israel, Middle East North Africa (MENA), and North America, including the United States.
Target Sectors	Technology, government, defense, and healthcare

Source: CrowdStrike

## Previous Cybersecurity Advisories

In the past four years, both the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) and the Multi-State Information Sharing & Analysis Center (MS-ISAC) have released cybersecurity advisories regarding the vulnerabilities of BIG-IP devices that have the potential to be exploited by threat actors.

Alert – CISA Adds Two Known Exploited Vulnerabilities to Catalog	
Date: October 31, 2023	<a href="#">Link</a>
Summary	
CISA has added two new vulnerabilities to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog, based on evidence of active exploitation.	
CVE-2023-46747 F5 BIG-IP Authentication Bypass Vulnerability CVE-2023-46748 F5 BIG-IP SQL Injection Vulnerability	
These types of vulnerabilities are frequent attack vectors for malicious cyber actors and pose significant risks to the federal enterprise. Note: To view other newly added vulnerabilities in the catalog, click on the arrow in the “Date Added to Catalog” column—which will sort by descending dates.	
Binding Operational Directive (BOD) 22-01: Reducing the Significant Risk of Known Exploited Vulnerabilities established the Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog as a living list of known Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVEs) that carry significant risk to the federal enterprise. BOD 22-01 requires Federal Civilian Executive Branch (FCEB) agencies to remediate identified vulnerabilities by the due date to protect FCEB networks against active threats. See the BOD 22-01 Fact Sheet for more information.	



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## Alert – CISA Adds Two Known Exploited Vulnerabilities to Catalog

Although BOD 22-01 only applies to FCEB agencies, CISA strongly urges all organizations to reduce their exposure to cyberattacks by prioritizing timely remediation of Catalog vulnerabilities as part of their vulnerability management practice. CISA will continue to add vulnerabilities to the catalog that meet the specified criteria.

## Cybersecurity Advisory – Threat Actors Exploiting F5 BIG-IP CVE-2022-1388

Date: October 12, 2022

Alert Code: AA22-138A

[Link](#)

### Summary

The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) and the Multi-State Information Sharing & Analysis Center (MS-ISAC) are releasing this joint Cybersecurity Advisory (CSA) in response to active exploitation of CVE-2022-1388. This recently disclosed vulnerability in certain versions of F5 Networks, Inc., (F5) BIG-IP enables an unauthenticated actor to gain control of affected systems via the management port or self-IP addresses. F5 released a patch for CVE-2022-1388 on May 4, 2022, and proof of concept (POC) exploits have since been publicly released, enabling less sophisticated actors to exploit the vulnerability. Due to previous exploitation of F5 BIG-IP vulnerabilities, CISA and MS-ISAC assess unpatched F5 BIG-IP devices are an attractive target; organizations that have not applied the patch are vulnerable to actors taking control of their systems.

According to public reporting, there is active exploitation of this vulnerability, and CISA and MS-ISAC expect to see widespread exploitation of unpatched F5 BIG-IP devices (mostly with publicly exposed management ports or self IPs) in both government and private sector networks. CISA and MS-ISAC strongly urge users and administrators to remain aware of the ramifications of exploitation and use the recommendations in this CSA—including upgrading their software to fixed versions—to help secure their organization’s systems against malicious cyber operations. Additionally, CISA and MS-ISAC strongly encourage administrators to deploy the signatures included in this CSA to help determine whether their systems have been compromised. CISA and MS-ISAC especially encourage organizations who did not patch immediately or whose F5 BIG-IP device management interface has been exposed to the internet to assume compromise and hunt for malicious activity using the detection signatures in this CSA. If potential compromise is detected, organizations should apply the incident response recommendations included in this CSA.

### Technical Details

CVE-2022-1388 is a critical iControl REST authentication bypass vulnerability affecting the following versions of F5 BIG-IP:

- 16.1.x versions prior to 16.1.2.2
- 15.1.x versions prior to 15.1.5.1
- 14.1.x versions prior to 14.1.4.6
- 13.1.x versions prior to 13.1.5
- All 12.1.x and 11.6.x versions

An unauthenticated actor with network access to the BIG-IP system through the management port or self IP addresses could exploit the vulnerability to execute arbitrary system commands, create or delete files, or disable services. F5 released a patch for CVE-2022-1388 for all affected versions—except 12.1.x and 11.6.x versions—on May 4, 2022 (12.1.x and 11.6.x versions are end of life [EOL], and F5 has stated they will not release patches).

POC exploits for this vulnerability have been publicly released, and on May 11, 2022, CISA added this vulnerability its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog, based on evidence of active exploitation. Due to the POCs and ease of exploitation, CISA and MS-ISAC expect to see widespread exploitation of unpatched F5 BIG-IP devices in government and private networks.

## Cybersecurity Advisory – Threat Actor Exploitation of F5 BIG-IP CVE-2020-5902

Date: July 24, 2020

Alert Code: AA20-206A

[Link](#)

### Summary

The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) is issuing this alert in response to recently disclosed exploits that target F5 BIG-IP devices that are vulnerable to CVE-2020-5902. F5 Networks, Inc. (F5) released a patch for CVE-2020-5902 on June 30, 2020. Unpatched F5 BIG-IP devices are an attractive target for malicious actors. Affected organizations that have not applied the patch to fix this critical remote code execution (RCE) vulnerability risk an attacker exploiting CVE-2020-5902 to take control of their system. Note: F5’s security advisory for CVE-2020-5902 states that there is a high probability that any remaining unpatched devices are likely already compromised.





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## Cybersecurity Advisory – Threat Actor Exploitation of F5 BIG-IP CVE-2020-5902

CISA expects to see continued attacks exploiting unpatched F5 BIG-IP devices and strongly urges users and administrators to upgrade their software to the fixed versions. CISA also advises that administrators deploy the signature included in this Alert to help them determine whether their systems have been compromised.

This Alert also provides additional detection measures and mitigations for victim organizations to help recover from attacks resulting from CVE-2020-5902. CISA encourages administrators to remain aware of the ramifications of exploitation and to use the recommendations in this alert to help secure their organization’s systems against attack.

### Technical Details

CISA has observed scanning and reconnaissance, as well as confirmed compromises, within a few days of F5’s patch release for this vulnerability. As early as July 6, 2020, CISA has seen broad scanning activity for the presence of this vulnerability across federal departments and agencies—this activity is currently occurring as of the publication of this Alert.

CISA has been working with several entities across multiple sectors to investigate potential compromises relating to this vulnerability. CISA has confirmed two compromises and is continuing to investigate. CISA will update this Alert with any additional actionable information.

## MITRE ATT&CK Techniques

### PIONEER KITTEN

The following are tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) that have been observed being used by PIONEER KITTEN in past incident response engagements. The table below illustrates these TTPs according to the MITRE ATT&CK framework.

Source: Picus Security		
Reconnaissance	T1596	Search Open Technical Databases
Initial Access	T1190	Exploit Public-Facing Application
Persistence	T1505.003	Web Shell
	T1136.001	Create Account (Local Account)
	T1098	Account Manipulation
	T1053	Scheduled Task/Job
	T1505	Server Software Component
Privilege Escalation	T1078.003	Valid Accounts: Local Accounts
	T1078.002	Valid Accounts: Domain Accounts
Defense Evasion	T1562.001	Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools
Credential Access	T1056	Input Capture
Execution	T1059.001	Command and Scripting Interpreter
Discovery	T1012	Query Registry
	T1482	Domain Trust Discovery
Command and Control	T1219	Remote Access Software
	T1572	Protocol Tunneling
Exfiltration and Impact	T1657	Exfiltration Over Web Service

### UNC5174

The following are tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) that have been observed being used by UNC5174 in past incident response engagements. The table below illustrates these TTPs according to the MITRE ATT&CK framework.



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Source: Mandiant		
Initial Access	T1190	Exploit Public-Facing Application
Defense Evasion	T1027	Obfuscated Files or Information
	T1070.004	File Deletion
	T1140	Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information
	T1222.002	Linux and Mac File and Directory Permissions Modification
	T1601.001	Patch System Image
Discovery	T1016	System Network Configuration Discovery
	T1049	System Network Connections Discovery
	T1082	System Information Discovery
	T1083	File and Directory Discovery
Command and Control	T1095	Non-Application Layer Protocol
	T1105	Ingress Tool Transfer
	T1572	Protocol Tunneling
	T1573.002	Asymmetric Cryptography
Execution	T1059	Command and Scripting Interpreter
	T1059.004	Unix Shell
Persistence	T1136.001	Local Account
Impact	T1531	Account Access Removal
Credential Access	T1003.008	/etc/passwd and /etc/shadow
Resource Development	T1608.003	Install Digital Certificate

## Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

The following are IOCs that have been observed being used per CVE in past incidents:

### CVE-2023-46748

Mandiant IOCs			
Network IOCs			
IP Address	ASN	NetBlock	Location
118.140.151[.]242	9304	HGC Global Communications Limited	(HK)
61.239.68[.]73	9269	Hong Kong Broadband Network Ltd.	(HK)
172.245.68[.]110	36352	Colocrossing	(U.S.)
URLs			
URL	Description		
http://172.245.68[.]110:8888	SUPERSHELL C2		
Host IOCs			
MD5 Hash	Filename	Type	Code Family
c867881c56698f938b4e8edafe76a09b	LG	ELF	SNOWLIGHT
df4603548b10211f0aa77d0e9a172438	N/A	ELF	SNOWLIGHT
0951109dd1be0d84a33d52c135ba9c97	N/A	ELF	SNOWLIGHT
9c3bf506dd19c08c0ed3af9c1708a770	memfd:a	ELF	N/A
0ba435460fb7622344eec28063274b8a	Undefined	ELF	SNOWLIGHT
a78bf3d16349eba86719539ee8ef562d	N/A	ELF	SNOWLIGHT

### CVE-2023-46747

Mandiant IOCs			
Network IOCs			
IP Address	ASN	NetBlock	Location



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Mandiant IOCs			
118.140.151[.]242	9304	HGC Global Communications Limited	(HK)
61.239.68[.]73	9269	Hong Kong Broadband Network Ltd.	(HK)
172.245.68[.]110	36352	Colocrossing	(U.S.)
URLs			
URL		Description	
http://172.245.68[.]110:8888		SUPERSHELL C2	
Host IOCs			
MD5 Hash	Filename	Type	Code Family
c867881c56698f938b4e8edafe76a09b	LG	ELF	SNOWLIGHT
df4603548b10211f0aa77d0e9a172438	N/A	ELF	SNOWLIGHT
0951109dd1be0d84a33d52c135ba9c97	N/A	ELF	SNOWLIGHT
9c3bf506dd19c08c0ed3af9c1708a770	memfd:a	ELF	N/A
0ba435460fb7622344eec28063274b8a	Undefined	ELF	SNOWLIGHT
a78bf3d16349eba86719539ee8ef562d	N/A	ELF	SNOWLIGHT

Phoenix Security IOCs
To check for IoCs associated with the SQL injection flaw in CVE-2023-46747 users are recommended to check the /var/log/tomcat/catalina.out file for suspicious entries like:
java.sql.SQLException: Column not found: 0.
sh: no job control in this shell
sh-4.2\$ <EXECUTED SHELL COMMAND>
sh-4.2\$ exit.

## CVE-2022-1388

Unit42 IOCs
Payload SHA256
30f7e1998d162dfad69d6d8abb763ae4033bbd4a015d170b1ad3e20d39cd4e20
da647646cd36a3acb716b4266e9032f9c1caf555b7667e1dbe5bef89e7d2fdbb
b39d2a1202351d3be5d9906ec47ee05c305302124dddec5538dc7b9924c6b85d
ad6d44c70f83431bedf890967f2da0607c9b1f79591fb1b2697160f5b1c1a75c
1f93a6696f7bf1b2067cc503583deb4840404ebee8a89579bd303f57000baeb7
9a72aab2a3d1d6e66c185966597a52a8726ca25f5d9e2195af44f98d8b1847d5
53214f4d2d2dfd02b46f416cbdc6f3a764820a50da4d59926f829b96cf82a6c
Source IPv4
20.187.67[.]224
192.132.218[.]149
85.203.23[.]73
116.48.110[.]159
Hosting URLs
hxxps://transfer[.]sh/dlxo3l/1.sh
hxxp://20.239.193[.]47/kele.sh
hxxp://20.239.193[.]47/kele1
hxxp://20.187.86[.]47/dadda
Cisco Talos Blog IOCs
IPs



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Unit42 IOCs			
5[.]189[.]191[.]107	103[.]144[.]149[.]49	157[.]245[.]200[.]184	189[.]137[.]76[.]246
29[.]104[.]233[.]152	103[.]177[.]174[.]34	157[.]245[.]206[.]99	189[.]146[.]90[.]233
41[.]79[.]198[.]118	104[.]208[.]85[.]237	159[.]89[.]182[.]71	193[.]29[.]15[.]143
45[.]61[.]139[.]143	104[.]244[.]72[.]174	161[.]35[.]156[.]235	194[.]163[.]164[.]206
45[.]79[.]171[.]157	107[.]189[.]29[.]64	161[.]35[.]158[.]59	194[.]163[.]185[.]138
51[.]159[.]66[.]249	109[.]205[.]176[.]248	161[.]35[.]209[.]168	194[.]195[.]219[.]144
52[.]74[.]130[.]60	113[.]23[.]27[.]104	161[.]35[.]232[.]12	194[.]195[.]86[.]50
53[.]85[.]187[.]67	113[.]67[.]10[.]13	163[.]143[.]106[.]199	194[.]233[.]171[.]91
58[.]213[.]200[.]67	119[.]140[.]78[.]118	163[.]32[.]193[.]116	194[.]233[.]77[.]245
64[.]39[.]106[.]34	12[.]172[.]214[.]26	164[.]90[.]205[.]93	194[.]5[.]73[.]6
64[.]39[.]108[.]98	120[.]170[.]212[.]254	167[.]172[.]83[.]249	196[.]65[.]108[.]171
64[.]39[.]98[.]152	120[.]245[.]25[.]3	167[.]172[.]83[.]250	198[.]211[.]120[.]110
64[.]39[.]98[.]159	121[.]196[.]223[.]32	167[.]172[.]83[.]251	198[.]252[.]101[.]110
64[.]39[.]98[.]196	122[.]161[.]50[.]64	167[.]99[.]225[.]132	204[.]195[.]115[.]184
64[.]39[.]98[.]227	122[.]75[.]182[.]121	172[.]104[.]15[.]189	206[.]189[.]200[.]122
64[.]39[.]98[.]140	124[.]160[.]154[.]32	172[.]70[.]126[.]146	207[.]180[.]241[.]85
66[.]254[.]159[.]252	128[.]199[.]16[.]44	172[.]70[.]131[.]167	208[.]71[.]210[.]1
66[.]94[.]126[.]14	132[.]145[.]21[.]77	172[.]70[.]131[.]147	209[.]58[.]170[.]164
68[.]183[.]202[.]236	137[.]184[.]236[.]99	172[.]70[.]222[.]71	210[.]92[.]18[.]153
69[.]24[.]129[.]229	139[.]99[.]149[.]66	172[.]81[.]129[.]138	212[.]102[.]50[.]210
72[.]166[.]5[.]40	141[.]11[.]28[.]89	174[.]138[.]22[.]187	217[.]252[.]7[.]13
72[.]167[.]51[.]207	141[.]11[.]28[.]97	175[.]107[.]236[.]67	223[.]187[.]119[.]114
79[.]18[.]33[.]4	144[.]202[.]124[.]151	178[.]62[.]228[.]64	223[.]72[.]39[.]119
81[.]69[.]58[.]15	144[.]202[.]59[.]76	180[.]236[.]169[.]125	226[.]137[.]152[.]105
82[.]80[.]33[.]200	144[.]76[.]251[.]214	181[.]214[.]206[.]31	250[.]100[.]25[.]148
87[.]20[.]54[.]33	145[.]215[.]56[.]53	185[.]147[.]212[.]58	253[.]240[.]199[.]27
88[.]226[.]109[.]164	149[.]28[.]147[.]208	185[.]212[.]61[.]84	103[.]85[.]25[.]79
91[.]36[.]121[.]76	150[.]230[.]38[.]225	185[.]239[.]226[.]177	156[.]34[.]23[.]233
94[.]177[.]118[.]79	156[.]146[.]34[.]98	186[.]80[.]52[.]118	
103[.]144[.]149[.]206	157[.]245[.]115[.]135	188[.]68[.]61[.]6	

## CVE-2020-5902

Trend Micro IOCs		
URLs		
URL	Description	
78.142.18.20	C&C server	
79.124.8.24	Disease vector	
SHA256		
SHA256	Description	Detection Name
acb930a41abdc4b055e2e3806aad85068be8d85e0e0610be35e784bfd7cf5b0e	fetch.sh	Trojan.SH.MIRAI.BOI
007254539d542563b4c4b66cee57cd1a49b5d4701d43f83db908f198aaf48229	sora.arm7	Backdoor.Linux.BASHLITE.SMJC
af5cceeafa2292b47042df22983d65c34fb57ff0f52fe4135738c53079b699fd1		
b2fe976028bf9b9b6f78c9461fd9e6389f41e357691226be7c64a8f6e01b3cf9		
191cda060fa0e34cc46c616d1308df8914d8fe53c5ce3dc232bec56467adccc9		
03254e6240c35f7d787ca5175ffc36818185e62bdfc		Backdoor.Linux.MIRAI.VWIUP





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Trend Micro IOCs		
4d88d5b342451a747156d		Backdoor.Linux.BASHLITE.SMJC
b02b5f8a1e0cd51f9fef2383ab2c9362b83ebab7bbd b46c9191355363f809f2e		
b22d772c4d825548f5d4f306be460f242e45065632 feffdde7a37f2725eb8e770		
b70e3766271993388db3fee403556ec5011afb4b1a 5a1e3e0803fce0c2592738		
b9e281aec5d8acb39939da7c5c4fd2538af924f11 0142de026b4b58e2dfc7c		
df6aa4092e9dc5de0371673e4fb2dc282aab74bbee 388638f41fb48d55eed64f		
f835db2dfe3fbe29ea63cbe83644f2b3b12c00f8ef3 04f403398c8a10d2d7a87		
232bd7a7beada597ce71f1607a8d58238b4f878bab af0a167573e976c681c521		
23a70da6677e77308d763d03340adf2321e547007 b98e424933aec3cb456ea61		
267600324455dcc91f395e87920a0431c31b1218ee b3b639521b350c9a6968b8		
46589461d1a2c2cda790032d5e7bd4c1b9f3a68113 915f985abe1fa7d6c4f7d6		
4fd5e82c2e94a246e01afcc0d01f9595d2b7ab8625 2b05c26d6d0e7bf45e9876		
5a4d5a6066ce47671e29f698ff7e4566d9b9b86778 08ba61200683f325d7921e		
556286fdef3600253f006f10eca18c3840377c72419 e6ac2690116ee589e8be9		
6226c32ec5b3bdace911cec2c14676bf4c51d5e6a1 83c1183d980a581d8207c		
6888a5d35be8fbbdab5ef3fbe9afc6ac6d9866028cc 37258b60fbc5c79c3c58f		
9b2629e5167d24654b03bba97c4e2c829ba599465 42b843801f9b13e7cd5f9f9		
af2eae10f700b8d004ce9c097f2a17e9edc3c2251d2 5ef658abf761975e07cee		Backdoor.Linux.MIRAI.VWIUP
a364513adc7103c95ee20580d8014369bc3321831 ec567b0f7a342c9b517d1cc		
c97d08c7a8c4465e1d6ef5da385ff670505477a4feb 0a376230e3100da5e687a		
de3d0a766b7dba822ed95b637968203b68759e73a ed6d904455e94a45882b493		
fd70873b5a9b06f0d02af878d426094bdf6e355383 3f5319bbb4dd7da0725db5		
f44ffa1041d89852588c1952fd7d4c82cf581c6cd70 060b29eea4d15170b4398		
f891113e672325b494af13f05081668eb916589daf 5cf962f130e2cf3a95cbe9		
15a5e8359e2451a49a922a004dc7e488077419b96 c7b9da87822768e22df2236		
159efac3fa13178f51f0da9fff3d3df914191cf15d171 7f4a5efaaeb3cc7bde7		
190dee3fcc4dd16b87674177ab25ed590b0c3a9b7 d5f4a9a7258d314558a678a		



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Trend Micro IOCs		
22e925219f1b8db8f81809abf8c904ca52ee9f78b88e2d1a03872db465670b06		
7d253e84fea4349307177aced6dc3c1b20cc96239cf2ff2274cb0bd52ae5a77d		
ad683393be8c09609588c67b9b978294b01fe04fa4dbca92eba8b360792361ec	sora.arm5	Trojan.Linux.MIRAI.SMNM1
dda2e6e5599a2e16dc0f0fce5579992a841063f1a71b7da9444aa92585f46245		
4c926ee55c6e3d1f881080c4b61734f3e7cf96124d8cb2c1fe33c8e8d8754a04	sora.arm5	
41f90b23dbc330f586c0bf5c6643d00fbd8e215d1222c1f156390a1d93d7d853	sora.arm5	
489fc54886d20e31c9e9e099712bfb85e63ae1633a17840a956f0b1f6559621d	sora.arm5	
616ca0c082553a61f8fda6a248129dc540ff51561b4495d41951f35b1c6d5788	sora.arm5	
7127c35dc0e8edc31bba08dda487dd496b82d596054d0361060aafac4ec0023a		
81feb98ef2ed4d99c6a0d48f8b6ae17b4bc137fa0ef0c0cb5f66ea1b4416a69a		
9a8ac8c6e3898a4c5112ce5c83a3a1b775b8287360120ed9ee62131d61171450		
037859323285e0bbbc054f43b642c48f2826924149cb1c494cbbf1fc8707f942	sora.arm5	
0423e9059fe3a60c889c9dbf0a91e2a68671f5e19da17b03804666569c7e1697		
45bce22f91e2116f2334fe9899fbf6f157847ddd840688f12498ec53b8dfb5e		Backdoor.Linux.MIRAI.SMNM4
687f1969da1747f27a315878560fa15d99f15176e8b045255e1318e2d9b2d30f		Backdoor.Linux.MIRAI.VWIUO
355d6ccef10ded805ab247c49dfd9e316608f7a4e01e4b9020a04066b9d7c17		Backdoor.Linux.MIRAI.SMMR1
815e9af39e5e143f81f4b043c17931a055bf31f852ad91fa6627140c0370c868		
ecc1e3f8332de94d830ed97cd07867b90a405bc9cc1b8deccec51badb4a2707c	sora.sh4	Backdoor.Linux.MIRAI.VWIUQ
e71aca778ea1753973b23e6aa29d1445f93dc15e531c706b6165502d6cf0bfa4	sora.x86	
15b2ee07246684f93b996b41578ff32332f4f2a60ef3626df9dc740405e45751	sora.mpsl	
204cbad52dde24ab3df41c58021d8039910bf7ea07645e70780c2dbd66f7e90b	sora.m68k	
3f8e65988b8e2909f0ea5605f655348efb87565566808c29d136001239b7dfa9	sora.mips	
43cb46b7e87317899a80134eb107597c4e80aed150b52606565c4aa9928d5ca0		
55c4675a84c1ee40e67209dfde25a5d1c1979454ec2120047026d94f64d57744	sora.arm6	
64608b5a68867aaa21574cd11b7008c946c026dbf43c2096280e4ee033da5819		
0ca27c002e3f905ddd9083c9b2f8b3c0ba8fb0976c6a06180f623c6acc6d8ca	sora.ppc	



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## Defense and Mitigations

On their website, F5 provides guidance on what to consider if you think the security of your BIG-IP system has been compromised, and provides recommendations depending on your corporate security policy.

If you suspect that your BIG-IP system is compromised, immediately notify the group in your organization that handles such incidents (typically IT). Proceed according to either an existing, defined process or policy, or using the group's recommendation.

Your internal process or policy dictates the specific actions that are relevant to your environment and may include an immediate action, such as the following:

- Isolating the compromised box from the rest of your network.
- Removing the malware by way of a clean install of the system.
- Recovering the configuration with a backup that is not infected and does not include a configuration that allows reinfection.
- Investigating the root cause of the security vulnerability.

The following list provides common indicators of security being compromised, though the list is not comprehensive:

- On platforms with a Trusted Platform Module (TPM), one indicator is that the Platform Configuration Register (PCR) values do not match the values published by F5. For more information about comparing PCR and published F5 values, refer to the following articles:
  - For BIG-IP 14.1.0 and later, refer to K58311205: Overview of Local Attestation and Remote Attestation with TPM on the BIG-IP system.
  - For versions prior to BIG-IP 14.1.0 and cases when the local or remote attestation test results are Unavailable or Invalid, refer to K93302141: Performing manual attestation with TPM on BIG-IP systems.
- Typically, when you upgrade BIG-IP software, the PCR values change. After the upgrade, you verify your BIOS version and then compare the values. For more information about verifying your BIOS version, refer to K14212: Displaying BIOS version information for BIG-IP systems (11.x).
- The BIG-IP system runs unknown processes.
- There are large spikes in device-generated traffic, which is typically an indication that the device is part of a botnet.
- There are unknown entries in /etc/init.d. When shut down, they may be used to ensure a malicious process is restarted.
- There are additions to various cron files; for example, the root user crontab is not updated.
  - You can check the system crontabs by looking at the file modification times for the cron files in /etc. For example: `ls -lt /etc/cron*`
  - You can check the root user crontab by looking at the file modification time for /var/spool/cron/root. For example: `ls -lt /var/spool/cron/root`
- There is an outbound connection to an unauthorized server, which you can see by running the `lsof` command.
- There are files or processes running from the /boot/ or /tmp/ directories.
- New files are created in unexpected directories such as /usr/local/www.
- New hidden files are created with unexpected, random, filenames. Note that any Unix filename



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beginning with a period (.) indicates a hidden file.

- You can search for hidden files using the find command. For example: `find /usr/local/www -type f -name '.*'`
- Unexpected log entries (for example, 'File does not exist' errors) in `/var/log/httpd/httpd_errors` may indicate reconnaissance or attempts to exploit a system, but they do not necessarily indicate successful exploitation.
  - In BIG-IP 14.1.0 and later, you can find these log entries running `journalctl /bin/logger`. Note that the systemd journal is limited to 20MB and therefore may quickly rotate log entries.

The majority of compromised security is a result of one or both of the following issues:

- There are management or self IP administrative ports accessible to the internet because either the management or self IP is public (and port 443 is open), or because traffic is rerouted to it by way of network address translation (NAT).
- You are using weak or default passwords.

## Recovery

To recover the system, consider the following recommendations:

- Important: F5 strongly recommends that you consult your corporate security policy for guidelines about incident handling procedures that are specific to your organization. More specifically, review the policies to ensure that they comply with evidence collection procedures for a security incident before you attempt to recover the system.
- Perform a clean installation of the system. For more information, refer to [K13117: Performing a clean installation of BIG-IP 11.x - 17.x](#).
- Perform a clean installation and restore the configuration from a user configuration set (UCS) file made before the security was compromised. For more information, refer to [K13132: Backing up and restoring BIG-IP configuration files with a UCS archive](#).
- Take steps to secure the system and prevent the clean installation from becoming compromised.
- If you do not have a UCS file made before the security was compromised, then seriously consider rebuilding the configuration from scratch.
- All security keys, certificates and credentials that are installed on the system may be compromised, and it may be prudent to assume that they are. Regenerate those in accordance with your corporate security policy.
- On platforms with a TPM, if the PCR values do not match the F5-published values, and you confirm it is not due to a false positive, open a case with F5 Support.
  - For more information, refer to [K2633: Instructions for submitting a support case to F5](#).
  - If you confirm tampering by an attacker by examining the PCR values, engage F5 Consulting Services or the F5 Sales team to replace the hardware.

## The Way Forward

In addition to the aforementioned defense and mitigation strategies and recommendations, HC3 recommends that HPH organizations utilize resources from [CISA Stop Ransomware](#), [HHS 405\(d\)](#), and the [H-ISAC](#) to proactively and reactively aid healthcare organizations with cybersecurity awareness and guidance.



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The probability of cyber threat actors targeting any industry remains high, but especially so for the Healthcare and Public Health (HPH) sector. Prioritizing security by maintaining awareness of the threat landscape, assessing their situation, and providing staff with the tools and resources necessary to prevent a cyberattack remains the best way forward for healthcare organizations.

## Relevant HHS Reports

[HC3: Analyst Note – Healthcare Sector DDoS Guide](#) (February 13, 2023)

[HC3: Sector Alert - Russian State-Sponsored and Criminal Cyber Threats to Critical Infrastructure](#) (April 26, 2022)

[HC3: Sector Alert - Understanding and Mitigating Russian State-Sponsored Cyber Threats to U.S. Critical Infrastructure](#) (January 11, 2022)

[HC3: Threat Briefing – Iranian Threat Actors & Healthcare](#) (November 3, 2022)

[HC3: Threat Briefing – North Korean and Chinese Cyber Crime Threats to the HPH](#) (September 21, 2023)

[HC3: Threat Briefing – Russian Threat Actors Targeting the HPH Sector](#) (February 15, 2024)

[HC3: Threat Profile – China-Based Threat Actors](#) (August 16, 2023)

[Health-ISAC and HC3 Joint Bulletin - Potential Malicious Cyber Attacks from Russia - Credible Threats to US Critical Infrastructure Sectors](#) (March 22, 2022)

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## Contact Information

If you have any additional questions, we encourage you to contact us at [HC3@hhs.gov](mailto:HC3@hhs.gov).

We want to know how satisfied you are with the resources HC3 provides. Your answers will be anonymous, and we will use the responses to improve all future updates, features, and distributions. [Share Your Feedback](#)